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As the use of the internet increases across the world, it becomes imperative to be aware of the 
ways in which economies can benefit from such use and to be equally aware of the 
impediments to the maximisation of these benefits. Cybercriminal activity is considered to be 
one of the impediments to the economic growth promised by e-commerce. This study seeks 
to examine the impact of cybercrime on e-commerce and regulation, a research direction that 
has potential to provide insight in respect of the mechanisms meant to safeguard against 
cybercrime. The study underscores the need to direct more robust efforts towards combating 
cybercrime in both Kenya and South Africa, an idea that could lead to significant contribution 
to the growth of African economies (namely Africa).  
 
This study is mainly underpinned by the Routine Activity Theory. A descriptive research design 
is employed. The study relies on reviews of relevant documents which include but are not 
limited to: legislation, case law, international law instruments. With these materials, an 
analysis has been carried out to interrogate cybercrime and cybersecurity and the way in 
which these concepts relate to each other in the context of e-commerce, and the extent to 
which they impact e-commerce and regulation. 
 
The findings reveal that while Africa is ahead of the international landscape in developing 
legislation, there are efficient mechanisms used internationally that African (mainly in Kenya 
and South Africa) dispensations can apply to her context. Future studies on this topic could 
broaden the scope of the study by exploring the impact of cybercriminal activity on Small 
Medium Enterprises which have also been identified as significant contributors to African 
economies.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the Research  
Upon the commercialisation of the internet and the rise in users seeking to participate in the 
World Wide Web in the 1990s, the term e-commerce was coined.1 Electronic Commerce, 
which is more commonly known as e-commerce, embodies technologies and infrastructures.2 
E-commerce unites narrow applications, entire industries, the exchange of digitally encoded 
information and economic activity on the global marketplace known as the internet.3  
However, defining e-commerce universally is challenging because the internet and its e-
commerce participants are various and complexly related. Moreover, the intricate 
relationships between all participants and technologies evolve rapidly. 
 
This research makes use of the definition submitted by Cudjoe4 which provides that e-
commerce is: business, society, technology and skills selling and buying products as well as 
services. This, according to Cudjoe, is done with the aid of computers and the internet or 
handheld devices. The process entails ordering of services or products to the time of delivery 
to the customer or consumer. 5 
 
There are several types of e-commerce that have been identified and it is important to 
highlight which types are most relevant to this research:  
 Business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce relates to a commercial activity between 
businesses, such as transactions that may take place between a retailer and a 
wholesaler.  
 Business-to-consumer or business-to-customer (B2C) e-commerce describes the 
conduct of a business serving the end consumer with a product and/or service. Online 
banking and online retail are examples of this type of e-commerce.  
                                                          
1 Cudjoe D, ‘Electronic Commerce: State-Of-The-Art’ 4(4) American Journal of Intelligent Systems, 2014, 136. 
2 Mann CL, Eckert SE and Cleeland Knight S, Global Electronic Commerce, Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC, 2000, 9. 
3 Mann CL et al, Global Electronic Commerce, 9. 
4 Cudjoe D, ‘Electronic Commerce: State-Of-The-Art’, 136. 
5 Nemat R, ‘Taking a look at different types of ecommerce’ (1)2 World Applied Programming, 2011, 101. 
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 Consumer-to-consumer (C2C) e-commerce is commercial activity that involves 
transactions between consumers facilitated by a third party such as online auctions 
where one consumer sells, the other bids and the third party charges a fee for 
facilitating the sale.  
 Consumer-to-business (C2B) e-commerce is a model where individual consumers are 
paid by companies for offering goods and services to companies.6 These types of 
companies are those that operate largely online, such as Amazon.  
 
Generally, the use of the internet has advanced human life quality. This is evident because 
the use of the internet in e-commerce is seen as an opportunity for developing countries and 
developing economies to gain more benefits from trade. On an e-commerce platform, the 
requirements to conduct business are less than in a traditional “brick and mortar” model using 
a physical building. For instance, there may be a requirement for storage space but one may 
still operate the business remotely meaning they would save on costs for rent when only 
paying for storage space. Therefore, a business might have fewer requirements for office 
infrastructure and maintenance, and thus, higher profit margins.7 It can be said that the main 
benefit introduced by e-commerce is that it has enabled users to engage in international 
business, which is the term employed to describe any transaction of a commercial nature that 
crosses the borders of nations.8   
 
There have been inadvertent consequences in the use of the internet in e-commerce9 mostly 
in the form of cybercrimes. Therefore, in this dissertation, I have explored the legal and 
technological ways that can be employed to respond to these cybercrimes. In doing this more 
effectively, I have reviewed the cybercrime response mechanisms already in existence in three 
jurisidictions and submit recommendations as to how these can be improved. Central to this 
                                                          
6 Nemat R, ‘Taking a look at different types of ecommerce’, 111 – 112. 
7 Cudjoe D, ‘Electronic Commerce: State-Of-The-Art’, 136. 
8 Wild JJ, Wild KL and Han JCY, International Business: The challenges of globalization, Pearson Education Inc., New 
Jersey, 2010, 32. 
9 Raghavan AR and Parthiban L, ‘The effect of cybercrime on a Bank’s finances’ 2(2) International Journal of Current 
Research and Academic Review, 2014, 173. 
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dissertation is the Kenyan, South African and United Kingdom legal dispensations, as well 
as an outline of the jurisdictional issues that arise with respect to prosecution for these crimes.  
 
Since there has been an increasing reliance on the internet by individuals and organisations, 
cybercrimes have posed financial threats along with theft of personal information and 
business data.10 Information for a competitive purpose or that which is for political purposes 
has been identified as one of the main motivations behind cybercriminal activity; in addition 
to this, financial gain has proved to be another motivator for cybercriminals. Apart from these 
main motivators, fun, grudges, and ideologies also drive a number of cybercriminals.11 There 
are different categories of cybercrimes that impact the types of e-commerce discussed above:  
 
 Phishing (also known as spoofing) is an attempt to ruse consumers or customers into 
divulging security information that is personal (this may include bank account 
numbers or credit card information) by posing as trustworthy business accounts.12  
 Spam mail which involves distributing bulk emails in order to advertise goods or 
services, usually at discounted prices, which may turn out to be fraudulent; and 
hacking, which has been defined as the unauthorised access into peoples’ computer 
systems and the subsequent use of such systems. 13 
 Hacking takes place in a number of stages, from information gathering to scanning to 
finally entering into the target system (for instance a business’ computer system). Thus, 
it has been identified as being similar to traditional robbery but that which occurs 
through the use of the internet.  
 Identity theft entails the theft of personal and sensitive information about people and 
the use of that information to commit theft or fraud.14  
 Internet auction fraud occurs where nonexistent goods/services are advertised and a 
consumer is hoaxed into paying for such ‘goods/services.’  
                                                          
10 Raghavan AR and Parthiban L, ‘The effect of cybercrime on a Bank’s finances’, 173. 
11 https://www.vircom.com/blog/cybercriminals-who-they-are-and-why-they-do-it/ 
12 Jahankhani H, Al-Nemrat A, Hosseinian-Far A, ‘Cybercrime Classification and Characteristics’ ReseachGate, 2014, 
157, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280488873 , on 10 March 2019. 
13 Jahankhani H, Al-Nemrat A, Hosseinian-Far A, ‘Cybercrime Classification and Characteristics’, 136. 




The categories of cybercrime discussed above, find relevance to this study because when each 
is committed, there is an interference with the transactions between consumers and 
consumers, businesses and businesses, or consumers and businesses. Such interferences may 
also lead to mistrust between the actors in business activity.  
 
From the above discussion, it can be deduced that cybercriminal activity has the effect of 
impeding the ability of users to engage safely in trade, which in turn has inopportune 
consequences to the economy. Put differently, since e-commerce is conducted on the internet 
and cybercrimes take place on the internet as well it can be said that these two activities are 
necessarily connected because the presence of one (cybercrime) affects the proper functioning 
of the other (e-commerce). 
 
1.2 Problem Statement  
The use of technology has become increasingly popular in our world. As has been alluded to 
above, e-commerce has brought benefits to trade, especially for countries such as Kenya and 
South Africa which are considered to be developing.  
 
This dissertation posits that the lack of specialised regulatory and technological mechanisms 
to manage cybercrime has adversely impacted advancements in trade, especially for 
developing countries like Kenya and South Africa. Because of the increase in crimes (with an 
increase from 3.8 million to 10.2 million recorded in Kenya)15 which breach the cybersecurity 
of internet users, and in particular those involved in different types of e-commerce, this 
malicious activity has impacted the law. Thus this calls for rigorous regulation to improve the 
effectiveness of existing legislation in Kenya, South Africa and the regulations that exist in 
United Kingdom which is a more developed jurisdiction. 
 
This study is concerned with the categories of these crimes, which affect the types of e-
commerce and have been discussed above. It is important to note that this issue is multi-
                                                          
15 Capital FM Kenya, ‘Plight against cybercrime rife in Kenya’ 02 July 2019 
<https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/business/2019/07/plight-against-cybercrime-rife-in-kenya/> on 12 August 2019. 
5 
 
layered in that it exists on an international level, because of the multijurisdictional nature of 
the crimes committed. The possible solutions to the outlined issues may be found through the 
development of existing legislation in Kenya and South Africa and in the development of 
security mechanisms in information technology (IT). 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Research  
The research has been conducted with the broad objective of assessing what measures are 
lacking in the regulatory and IT environments to guard against cybercriminal activity as a 
factor that impedes the growth promised by e-commerce to economies. 
 
1.4 Hypothesis  
The proposed hypothesis for this research is stated as follows: the development of cybercrime 
and data privacy legislation in combination with the refinement of cybersecurity measures in 
IT is positively associated with mitigating cybercrime, which affects e-commerce transactions. 
 
The specific impact of cybercrime that I investigate in this research is that of the ability of 
users to partake in e-commerce. The impact related to jurisdictional matters that arise when 
responding to cybercrime has also been explored. 
 
The hypothesis submitted above is based on the understanding that robust regulation in 
combination with enhanced technological mechanisms will tighten cybersecurity, and 
thereby, reduce the rates of cybercriminal activity. 
 
1.5 Research Questions  
This research propounds that effecting improvements to the legal framework together with 
software technology will result in advanced cybersecurity measures and, in turn, protect users 
from the rising cybercrimes. In light of this, a number of questions become relevant, with the 
primary question being:  
1. What is the impact of cybercrime on e-commerce and regulatory frameworks in 
Kenya, South Africa, and the United Kingdom?  
Secondary questions are as follows:  
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1. What constitutes e-commerce in Kenya, South Africa, and the United Kingdom? 
2. What constitutes cybercrime in Kenya, South Africa, and the United Kingdom? 
3. How does cybercrime impact regulatory frameworks? 
4. What methods are employed in law and information communications technology to 
respond to cybercrime in Kenya, South Africa, and the United Kingdom? 
 
1.6 Literature Review  
As alluded to in the background to the problem, an unintended consequence that follows 
when users engage in e-commerce is cybercrime. The crime committed through the use of 
computers has resulted in financial damage amounting to billions.16 Because companies do 
not always disclose all information on the impact of cyberattacks, it has proved difficult to 
accurately quantify the losses that are experienced by victims of cyberattacks. In spite of this 
difficulty, the results indicate that cyberattacks negatively impact businesses by disrupting 
them, causing loss of information, revenue, and damage to equipment. 17 
 
Developing technological and suitable legislation has been conceded to respond to cybercrime 
as well as to promoting cybersecurity, which are integral aspects in addressing this matter.18 
Insufficient protection measures pose a greater risk in developing countries because of the 
weaker safeguards and protection in these countries. Poor internet security may result in 
developing countries encountering challenges in promoting participation in e-commerce.19  
 
                                                          
16 Podgor ES, ‘Cybercrime’, 99. 
17 Bendovschi A, Cyberattacks – Trends, Patterns and Security Countermeasures, International Conference on 
Financial Criminology organisd by Wadham College, Oxford, 13-14 April 2015, 28-29. 
18 Gercke M, ‘Understanding Cybercrime: phenomena, challenges and legal response’ International 
Telecommunications Union, 2012, 97 <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Cybersecurity/Documents/Cybercrime2014_E.pdf> on 27 April 2019. 
19 Gercke M, ‘Understanding Cybercrime: phenomena, challenges and legal response’ International 
Telecommunications Union, 2012, 4.  
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On the African continent, it has been submitted that cybercrime has cost Africa’s economy 
billions, with e-commerce costing the continent an estimated 173 million USD owing to its 
vulnerability to cybercrime.20 
 
Serianu, a Pan-African consulting firm, committed to providing consulting services on 
technology, has shed much light on the progression of cybercrime and cybersecurity in Kenya 
(and other African countries) over the past seven years. In 2012, it was reported that Kenya’s 
percentage for cybercrime is significantly higher than what has been recorded on a global 
scale.21 The firm, in 2013, noted that the relationship between internet usage and 
cybercriminal activity was such that as the former increases, so does the latter. Furthermore, 
it was recorded that the malware activity increased from what was recorded during the 
previous year.22 In 2016, it was submitted that the approximate expenditure on cybercrime 
amounts to 175 million USD in Kenya,23 this estimation went up to 210 million USD in 
2017.24 An approximation of certified professionals in the IT space was also recorded in these 
reports. The number of professionals has proved to be wanting as there are seemingly not 
enough professionals with the skill set to assist in combating these issues.  
 
In South Africa, cases of cyber-espionage, data exposures of a malicious nature, and hacking 
have been recorded to have taken place between the years 2013 to 2017. These attacks are 
reported to have cost the country millions of ZAR. The South African Banking Risk 
Information Centre (SABRIC) submitted that cyberattacks cost the country an estimation of 
157 million USD annually. 25 Toure, who was previously the secretary of the International 
Telecommunications Union, stated that cybercriminals deem the African continent as an 
ideal place to conduct illicit activity with impunity. 26 
                                                          
20 Dahir AL, ‘Cybercrime is costing Africa’s businesses billions’ Quartz Africa, 2018 
<https://qz.com/africa/1303532/cybercrime-costs-businesses-in-kenya-south-africa-nigeria-billions/ > 05 
September 2019.  
21 Serianu, Kenya Cybersecurity Report, 2012, 5. 
22 Serianu, 2013, 13. 
23 Serianu, 2016, 10. 
24 Serianu, 2017, 11. 
25 Van Niekerk B, ‘An Analysis of Cyber-Incidents in South Africa’ 20 The African Journal of Information and 
Communication, 2017, 117 – 118.  
26 Kshetri N, ‘Cybercrime and Cybersecurity in Africa’ 22(2) Journal of Global Information Technology Management, 




I argue that this statement highlights the importance of the creation of punitive sanctions for 
such illegal activity as a means to deter such activity.  
 
Several security technologies have, over the years, been developed worldwide in an effort to 
maintain secure networks.27 Such technologies are Intrusion Detection Systems, Pretty Good 
Privacy, Secure Socket Layer, IP Security, and Wired Equivalent Privacy, to name a few. 
Cybercrimes continue to rise in spite of these developments.28  
 
Internal and external security countermeasures have been developed in response to the need 
for cybersecurity to protect users against cybercrimes. The internal countermeasures that have 
been submitted are continuous risk assessment, maintenance of a healthy IT environment, 
authentication; internal commitment and responsibility, access to information, data retention, 
and independent reviews. Where external countermeasures are concerned, there are various 
nonprofit organisations that have attempted to make users aware of the risks of and exposure 
to cyberattacks as well as how users can defend themselves from such attacks. Among these 
organisations are the Secure Domain Foundation (SDF) and the International Association of 
Cyber-crime Prevention (IACP). In addition to these organisations, Google has developed a 
team – Project Zero – which seeks to analyse vulnerabilities in other company codes and their 
own in order to improve software products and ultimately reduce the risk of cyberattacks. 
Financial institutions such as AXA Corporate Solutions Company have introduced insurance 
products that cover the costs lost as a result of a cyberattack.29  
 
In addition to this, other external measures to promote cybersecurity are the developments to 
legislative frameworks in response to cybercrime and to promote cybersecurity by deterring 
cybercriminals. The Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act was promulgated in May of 2018 in 
Kenya. This piece of legislation mainly purports to ensure that using computer systems for 
illegal purposes is prevented, also to protect the confidentiality of users and data. The offences, 
                                                          
27 Comer DE, Computer and Networks Internets with Internet Application, Pearson Education Inc., New Jersey, 
2004, 618 – 619. 
28 Comer DE, Computer and Networks Internets with Internet Application, 618 – 619.  
29 Bendovschi A, Cyberattacks – Trends, Patterns and Security Countermeasures, 28-29. 
9 
 
investigation procedures, and international co-operation, among other provisions, are 
outlined in the Act. Until now, no case law has been reported where the above-mentioned 
Act has been applied. However, the statistics of cybercrime and their impact are indicative of 
the need that arose for the development of legislation to address these crimes. In a 2016 report, 
it was noted that at least 19 organisations in Kenya were affected by a ransomware virus that 
was ongoing globally.30  
 
In South Africa, the Regulation of Interceptions and Provision of Communications-Related 
Information Act (RICA),31 and the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECTA)32 are 
the main regulations that seek to address cybercrime. It is in this latter Act, that the 
jurisdiction for cybercrimes is outlined.33 There are other pieces of legislation enacted prior to 
the Acts mentioned such as the Prevention of Organised Crime Act.34 The most recent 
development in the South African legal dispensation is the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill, 
which was proposed to address the shortcomings and gaps that have been found in prior 
pieces of legislation.35 
 
The United Kingdom has been far ahead of the two jurisdictions mentioned above with its 
Computer Misuse Act that was enacted in the nineties.36 Over a decade later the Data Protection 
Act came into force in 2018.37 
 
Because of the cross-border nature of international business activity,38 the crimes committed 
in this field may give rise to issues of jurisdiction.39 The matter of jurisdiction is relevant to 
this research because one of the solutions proposed is the development of legal frameworks 
                                                          
30 Nida T, ‘The Impact of Cyberattacks on Financial Institutions’ 23(2) Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce, 
2018, 7. 
31 Regulation of Interception of Communications (Act No. 70 of 2002). 
32 Section 85 – 89, Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (Act No. 25 of 2002). 
33 Section 90, Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (Act No. 25 of 2002).  
34 Prevention of Organised Crime Act(Act No. 38 of1999) 
35 Schultz CB, ‘Cybercrime: An Analysis of Current Legislation in South Africa’ unpublished, University of Pretoria, 
Pretoria, 2016, 9. 
36 Computer Misuse (Act of 1990). 
37 Data Protection (Act of 2018). 
38 Wild JJ et al, International Business, 32. 
39 Podgor ES, ‘Cybercrime: National, Transnational or International’ 50(97) The Wayne Law Review, 2004: 97. 
10 
 
that respond adequately to cybercrime and in order to have an adequate response jurisdiction 
must be provided for. Jurisdictional issues may arise because of differences in the definition 
of the crime and the subsequent penalties imposed for that defined crime in a specific state.40 
As a result, it becomes difficult to conduct investigations because procedural laws are specific 
to the territory in which they exist.41 As early as 1980, the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) issued Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Trans-border Flows of Personal Data, which encompassed guidelines and 
principles. In 2007, the OECD then published Cross-border Cooperation in the Enforcement 
of Laws Protecting Privacy. Data privacy is inadvertently connected to issues that relate to 
cybercrime because when categories of data, such as the private details of an individual, are 
easily accessible, it creates an environment that enables cybercriminal activity. There are 
universal principles that are applicable to data privacy, which are derived from these 
international instruments. Briefly, these principles may be stated as follows:42 
 
 The processing of data must be done fairly and lawfully.  
 When data is processed, the purpose for such processing must be fair and lawful and 
this processing should be done for a limited range of purposes. 
 The nature of the data must at all times be accurate and if it is necessary to do so, the 
data must be updated at regular intervals. 
 Where data is kept, it must be for limited and not unnecessarily prolonged periods. 
 The rights of the data subject must be taken into account when data is processed. The 
data must not be processed in a manner that infringes on such rights. 
 The data should at all times be secure. 
 Before data is transferred between nations, it must be ensured that there is adequate 
protection of the personal data 
 
                                                          
40 Podgor ES, ‘Cybercrime’, 97. 
41 Brenner SW, Schwerha JJ, ‘Introduction—Cybercrime: A Note on International Issues’ 6(2) Information Systems 
Frontiers, 2004, 111. 
42 Mwangi RW, ‘Data Protection Principles and Cybercrime in Kenya’ unpublished, Catholic University of Eastern 
Africa, Nairobi, 2010,   
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There have been other more recent developments that I have focused on in this study because 
the use of the internet is ever-changing meaning more recent frameworks are relevant as older 
frameworks can quickly become obsolete. These developments include the Council of 
Europe’s introduction of the Convention on Cybercrime43 which seeks to establish uniform 
standards for the response to cross-border cybercrimes. The African Union also adopted the 
African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection44 in 2014 with the aim of 
addressing the jurisdictional challenges that arise on an African level. In addition to this, the 
European Union promulgated the Global Data Protection Regulation, which frames the 
protection of private and personal data as a fundamental right.45 These pieces of legislation 
are important because they seek to establish uniformity among legislative frameworks and 
avoid the confusion caused by those that are difficult to apply because of major territorial 
differences.  
 
An analysis of the literature suggests first that cybercrime is a rising concern; second that the 
alarming increase in cybercrime acts as an impediment to business activities especially in 
developing countries and lastly, that the matter should be addressed in order to counter the 
adverse consequences. This study posits that an ideal response to this issue is the interface of 
a specialised regulatory framework together with advancements in technology to promote 
cybersecurity. 
 
1.7 Theoretical Framework 
The purpose of a theoretical framework is to provide guidance to a research study as well as 
to highlight the variables that the study seeks to assess and to explore the relationship that 
exists between such variables.46  
 
A few theories that are found in information systems are the Technology Acceptance Theory, 
(TAM) which models that a user’s perception of technology is deterministic of the user’s 
                                                          
43 Article 22, Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, ETS 185. 
44 African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection, 27 June 2014. 
45 Mcdermott Y, ‘Conceptualizing the right to data protection in an era of Big Data’ SAGE Journals, 2017, 1. 
46 Obeng-Adjei A, ‘Analysis of Cybercrime Activity: Perceptions from a South African Financial Bank’ unpublished, 
University of the Witwaterstrand, Johannesburg, 2017, 19.  
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acceptance of that technology.47 The Stages Theory consists of concepts for assimilating the 
way in which IT is absorbed into business organisations. The Structuration Model describes the 
way in which changes in technology influence organisational design. Specifically related to 
the structuration model, is the Adaptive Structuration Theory, (AST) which detects the influence 
of changes to organisations in two ways. First, the various structures, which are dispensed by 
the technological advances, and second, the structures that emerge as the use of technology 
increases.48 
 
This particular study combines elements from IT as well as cybercriminal activity and law, 
which indicates that two theories are relevant to this study. However, the focus has been 
placed on one theory. This theory being the Adaptive Structuration Theory, which is relevant 
to the element of the study that relates to information systems because various structures and 
bodies have emerged for purposes of cybersecurity. Where the crime aspect of this study is 
concerned, use of the Routine Activity Theory mainly has been made. According to this theory, 
it is the structure of routine everyday activity that influences criminal opportunity.49 
Underpinning this theory is the notion that structural changes in routine activity patterns have 
the ability to influence the rates of crime by affecting the confluence of the three elements of 
predatory violations. These elements are motivated offenders, suitable targets as well as a lack 
of guardians to guard against crime. Yar50 has posited that the absence of one of these three 
elements is enough to aid the prevention of a complete predatory crime that involves direct 
contact.  
 
It can be said that the presence of the mentioned three elements in cybercrime elucidates the 
alarming increase in cybercrime. In other words, the conditions (outlined in the routine 
                                                          
47 Halawi L, McCarthy R, ‘Which Theory Applies: An Analysis of Information Systems Research’ Issues in Information 
Sysytems, 7(2), 2006, 252. 
48 Halawi L, McCarthy R, ‘Which Theory Applies: An Analysis of Information Systems Research’ Issues in Information 
Sysytems, 7(2), 2006, 253. 
49 Yar M, ‘The Novelty of Cybercrime: An Assessment in Light of the Routine Activity Theory’ European Journal of 
Criminology (2)4, 2005, 412. 
50 Yar M, ‘The Novelty of Cybercrime: An Assessment in Light of the Routine Activity Theory’ European Journal of 
Criminology (2)4, 2005, 413. 
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activity theory) for cybercrime to flourish are ideal. In order for the rise in cybercrime to be 
countered, one of these conditions must be altered.  
 
To apply this directly to this study, I identify the three elements in this study to be: cybercrime, 
e-commerce and regulation. The motivated offenders are the cybercriminals, the suitable 
condition is the e-commercial activity on the internet, and the lack of a guardian is the lack of 
a specialised framework. I opine that if this last aspect is altered by developing a legal 
framework will aid the prevention of a complete crime.  
 
1.8 Research Methodology  
The research methodology of a study furnishes a strategic plan of the way in which the 
research will be executed, which is a tool that encompasses the application of research design 
and procedures for collecting and analysing data.51  
 
A research design has been defined by Kerlinger52 as the structure that seeks to address 
research questions and manage variance. The design may be used to convey the way in which 
the crucial elements of the research collaborate in an attempt to respond to the questions that 
are central to the research.53  
 
There are several types of research design that have been identified in research methods, these 
include an exploratory design, which is the type employed where the field of research is new, 
and there are few or no studies that have been made that can be referenced. Another, 
explanatory design/analytical, is most suitable for studies that seek to explore a new universe, 
which has not been studied before. Such research designs exist among a variety of other 
types.54 
 
                                                          
51 Njogore EW, ‘Effects Cybercrime Related Costs on Development of Financial Innovation Products and Services: A 
Case Study of NIC Bank of Kenya’ Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, Nairobi, 2017, 33. 
52 Penial BB, ‘Research Design’ ResearchGate, 2017, 1 < 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308262064_Research_Design> on 27 April 2019. 
53 Penial BB, ‘Research Design’ ResearchGate, 2017, 2. 
54 Akhtar I, ‘Research in Social Science: Interdisciplinary Perspectives’ ResearchGate, 2016, 73 – 74 < 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308915548_Research_Design> on 27 April 2018. 
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In this study, the descriptive research design has been utilised. The descriptive research design 
may also be referred to as statistical research which illustrates events which exist as such. 
Where pinpointing and acquiring information related to a particular issue is necessary, this 
type of design is most useful. This is because a descriptive design entails an observer describing 
social events in a current situation.55 
 
The procedure involved in a descriptive study, in general, and in particular to this research, 
can be outlined as follows: the selection of an objective for the research, determination of the 
manner in which data will be collected, selection of sampling, the collection of real data, and 
the evaluation of the conclusion that has been reached from the collection of data.56 
 
The nature of this study being that information related to an issue has been identified and 
collected, determines that the descriptive design research method is most appropriate. 
Uncovering information to present a possible solution to the pressing issue of cybercrime as 
it relates to e-commerce is the purpose of this research. The technique for data collection that 
I have be employed is the review of documents and records, namely legislation, case law and 
international law instruments. With this material, I have made an analysis of what cybercrime 
and cybersecurity are and the way in which these concepts relate to each other in the context 
of e-commerce. This information has then be used to draw a comparison between existing 
situations and legislative frameworks in Kenya and those in South African for an African 
perspective as well as those in the UK for an international perspective. These three 
jurisidictions are the scope of this study. However, I have submitted a commentary on 
jurisdictional issues that arise where legislating cybercrime is concerned.  
 
1.9 Assumptions  
The problem identified in this research is constructed based on the assumption that if no 
robust cybersecurity measures are adopted, there will be a further increase in the cybercrimes 
committed which will affect the potential growth of e-commerce. Inadvertently, this will affect 
                                                          
55 Akhtar I, ‘Research in Social Science: Interdisciplinary Perspectives’ ResearchGate, 2016, 75. 




the economies of Kenya, South Africa and the UK, since it has already been suggested 
submitted that e-commerce provides a significant contribution to economies. 
 
1.10 Chapter Breakdown  
In exploring the topic, the mini-thesis is comprised of four chapters with the first as the 
introduction. The second gives insight into the development of and the current legal 
dispensation in Kenya and South Africa to respond to cybercrime and the institutions that 
have emerged for cybersecurity. In the third chapter, the position in the UK is outlined to 
provide a perspective outside of the African continent and then I proceed to make use of the 
UK perspective as a point of reference to compare it to the African continent. In the fourth 
and final chapter the conclusion and recommendation on these findings are provided.  
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In the discussion in the preceding chapter, it has been highlighted that cybercrime is a critical 
issue, especially for the African continent where technology could be a key factor in advancing 
the social and economic landscape. The promise of development driven by technology can be 
seen in the surfacing of technology hubs in Africa that bring about the promise of 
entrepreneurship and innovation to the continent. Kenya and South Africa are locations to 
such hubs among other countries on the continent.57   
 
However, this development is stifled by a number of issues such as cybercrime. Another of 
these issues being that the focus of the African continent is, and has been, centred around the 
eradication of illnesses such as HIV as well as poverty, delivery of basic services, a rise in 
unemployment, addressing corruption have led to cybercrime being tackled as a peripheral 
issue.58  
 
In this chapter, I delve into the discussion pertaining to the legislative developments that have 
been made up until this point in Kenya as well as in South Africa. In addition to this, I note 
the institutions that have emerged as a measure to respond to cybercrime and in turn promote 
cybersecurity and provide commentary on how effective such developments have been. This 
study proposes that this development is threatened by the rise of cybercrime which can be 




                                                          
57 De Beer J et al, ‘A Framework for Assessing Technology Hubs In Africa’ 6(2), Journal Of Intellectual Property And 
Entertainment Law, 2017, 239 – 240. 
58 Gumbi D, ‘Understanding the threat of cybercrime: A comparative study of cybercrime and the ICT legislative 
frameworks of South Africa, Kenya, India, the United States and the United Kingdom’ published, University of Cape 
Town, Cape Town, 2018, 11. 
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2.2 Contextual Issues Relating to Kenya and South Africa  
As it has already been established, we have witnessed a rapid surge in utilisation of the internet 
globally. This increase has brought support to the development in the e-commerce industry 
globally through mainly introducing novel methods and ways of transacting as well as 
presenting the promise of economic development for Least Developed Countries (LDCs). 
Currently, the top six e-commerce sites in Africa have been identified as the Jumia group 
which is a Nigerian based company operating in 14 countries in Africa; Zando as the 
subsidiary of Jumia which was launched on South Africa in 2012; Takealot founded in 2002 
in South Africa and Kilimall known as Kenya’s largest online shopping mall, among others. 
It is worth noting that the use of MPESA (mobile money) in Kenya has made a significant 
contribution to e-commerce activity as it has provided a somewhat secure platform on which 
mobile transactions can take place thus encouraging online purchases.59 
 
E-commercial activity is recognised as a platform with the potential to contribute to income 
generation through the facilitation of trade and in this way as having the ability to contribute 
to gross national product (GDP) as this is likely to foster export growth and the creation of 
employment opportunities. With the use of e-commerce a local business has access to a wider 
market when it penetrates the internet space. In developing countries, where women are often 
on the side line with respect to making a contribution to household income, e-commerce 
presents an opportunity for women to trade since it encourages entrepreneurship. 
Furthermore, the use of the internet to engage in e-commerce activities creates a demand for 
specialised skills required to navigate cyberspaces which in turn creates a demand for 
individuals to be educated on those skills. This is beneficial to institutions for higher learning 
as it broadens the courses that they can offer to potential students.60 
 
As I have highlighted above, e-commerce itself has not penetrated the African economy to 
the same extent that it has penetrated other economies. Where it has penetrated the African 
economy there are a number of challenges that hinder the potential growth and development 
                                                          
59 Maseko F, ‘6 sites driving eCommerce in Africa’ 26 January 2019 <https://www.itnewsafrica.com/2019/01/6-
sites-driving-ecommerce-in-africa/> on 03 February 2020. 
60 Ndonga D, ‘E-Commerce in Africa: Challenges and Solutions’ 5 African Journal of Legal Studies, 2012, 244 - 246. 
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that can be fostered by e-commerce. The term ‘digital divide’ has been coined and is 
understood to describe the disparities identified between Africa and the rest of the world 
where Information Communications Technology (ICT) is concerned. Much of this divide is 
attributed to lack of access and poor usability of ICT infrastructure resulting from poor 
knowledge about ICT and the infrastructure. The other aspect, which is most relevant to this 
study, concerns the threat of cybercrimes. A result of the alarming rise in cybercriminal 
activity has been Africans being reluctant to make use of the e-commerce platform for goods 
and services. While Africans may use online websites to view products and services, most still 
opt to make use of these goods/services in the traditional way. Therefore, it is argued that 
with the development of robust regulatory mechanisms, which respond to the lack of 
awareness with respect to ICT as well as frameworks that respond to and control cybercrimes 
such that Africa can realize the potential of e-commerce to contribute to overall economic 
growth.61 
 
2.2.1 Kenya  
Where the types of cybercrime are concerned, in 2012 Serianu reported that spamming was 
on the rise in Kenya and that although spam emails were generally harmless advertising, a 
new breed of spamming which contain viruses was discovered. Botnets, Trojans and worms 
have also been identified as a cyber threat to the country’s networks.62 The top cyber threats 
in 2013 were reported as follows: Insider Threats mainly by employees; VoIP (Voice over 
Internet Telephony) PBX fraud where hackers gained access to business PBX phone systems 
to generate profit from making calls to international numbers; Social Media Attacks which 
consisted of cyber-bullying, hate speech, posting of obscene images; Denial of Service attacks; 
Botnet Attacks; Cyber Espionage; Mobile Money Fraud and Online/Mobile Banking. The 
attacks and threats of this nature were found to be more frequent and more targeted because 
cybercriminals made use of sophisticated tactics to permeate weaknesses in security systems 
and programs.63 
 
                                                          
61 Ndonga D, ‘E-Commerce in Africa, 2012, 256. 
62 Serianu, 2012, 5. 
63 Serianu, 2014, 11. 
19 
 
The year 2016 saw the increase of malware, targeting cell phone and internet banking, which 
compromised and continues to compromise the safety of users’ information on the given. 
Platforms, where e-commerce is conducted, were attacked with more cybercriminal activity 
in the form of identity theft and ATM card scamming. Mobile money (MPESA), which is 
widely used in Kenya, was also targeted by cybercriminals which resulted in major monetary 
losses as well. During this year it was also discovered that the reason for the overwhelming 
increase in cybercriminals operating from Kenya is that Kenyan professionals do not have the 
sufficient tools to explore the ways in which criminals commit these crimes.64  
 
Furthermore, a lack of practical regulatory guidance from industry regulators was identified 
as another contributory factor to the thriving cybercrimes. The issue of enforcement and 
implementation of regulation surfaced and was attributed to regulation that is not context 
sensitive but that which is borrowed from other jurisdictions as well as the issue of a lack of 
education and training among members of law enforcement and the judiciary.65 
 
From the reports in 2017, there appeared to be a persistence in the need for better technical 
training to deal with cybercrime and ultimately achieve a secure cyberspace. This was noted 
by various industry players namely, Dr Githinji who opines that the lack of specialised 
academic programmes to meet the cybersecurity needs in the industry. The other issue that 
was rampant during this reporting period is the malicious spread of ‘fake news’ which largely 
affects the vulnerable public who can be manipulated using this information.66  
 
Following an eight-year drafting process, legislation known as the Computer Misuse and 
Cybercrimes Act was enacted in 2018. The objective of this Act, as discussed above, is to address 
is to improve the effectiveness of previous legislation. The Data Protection Bill was also 
promulgated in 2018 with the purpose of ensuring that companies who collect, store and 
process the data of doing so with permission.67 
 
                                                          
64 Serianu, 2016, 11. 
65 Serianu, 2016, 12. 
66 Serianu, 2017, 12. 
67 Serianu, 2018, 66. 
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2.2.2 South Africa  
In 2014 it was reported that South Africa was at a loss of an estimated ZAR50 billion resulting 
from cyber-incidents. In addition to this, that more than one half of a billion records of a 
personal nature stored online were lost and illegally accessed in the year 2015. These figures 
were reported by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) News. In 2011 an 
approximate ZAR3,7 billion in direct losses and ZAR6,5 billion in indirect losses were 
recorded. The increase in internet users was estimated to lead to cyber-threats becoming more 
widespread.68  
 
These cyber-threats and malware attacks were, according to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI), by hackers, who targeted financial institutions, private entities including 
government entities in South Africa, which has been noted as a country among those which 
have been most vulnerable to cybercriminal activity.69 
 
The Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services submitted a report on Cyber-
Readiness in which it was provided that organisations should put in place mechanisms to 
defend against such attacks in their risk management procedures. Hosting training to raise 
awareness, making changes to policy and technical controls are among the measures that an 
entity can take. Such initiatives may be a progressive step towards addressing the challenges 
that have been identified as a lack of skilled individuals and poor awareness among other 
things.70 Furthermore, the lack of administrative will, implementation programmes, which 
are wanting as well as coordination of inter-governmental mandates that are poor, have all 
contributed to the ineffectiveness of the current laws and policy frameworks developed to 
address cybercrime issues.71 
 
                                                          
68 Van Niekerk B, ‘An Analysis of Cyber-Incidents in South Africa’ 20, The African Journal of Information and 
Communication, 2017, 115. 
69 Schultz CB, ‘Cybercrime: An Analysis of Current Legislation in South Africa’ published, University of Pretoria, 
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2.3 Regulatory Developments in Response to Cybercrime 
In 2014 the Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection was adopted by the African 
Union. The broad purpose of the convention is to develop a credible cyberspace as well as to 
respond to the gaps which affect the regulation of the digital environment. The convention 
also had the objective to establish standards and procedures that seek to respond to the issues 
arising in cybersecurity in Africa. Such a response includes the harmonisation of legislation. 
In article 1 of the convention a number of terms are defined one of which being Electronic 
commerce (e-commerce) which finds relevance to this study. According to the definition in 
the convention e-commerce constitutes actions that entail offering, buying or the provision of 
services and goods through the use of computer systems networks for telecommunications 
such as the internet or other networks which make use of optical, electronic or any other 
media akin to these for information exchange over a distance. The duty to adopt legislation 
against cybercrime as well as to facilitate the emergence of national regulatory authorities is 
provided for in Article 25 of the convention. This Article also provides for the rights of citizens 
to the extent that the development of frameworks together with the adoption of 
implementation measures is done in such a way the rights of citizens are not infringed. The 
protection of critical infrastructure is also provided for in this article which provides that the 
protection of critical infrastructure involves identifying the sectors in which such 
infrastructure exists and making provision for the more punitive sanctions for criminal 
conduct that impacts these infrastructures.72  
 
In Article 29 of the convention, the nature of activities which are specific to information 
communication technologies are provided, and these activities are required to appear as 
offences in the legislative developments by the member states. These offences include attacks 
on computer systems which are outlined as gaining access to or attempting to gain access to 
computer systems when authorised to do so and further to use such access to commit a crime 
or to facilitate commission of another crime. This article also provides that it is an offence to 
remain, enter or to make an attempt to remain or enter in a computer system fraudulently. 
Impacting the functioning of a computer system through hindering or distorting or attempting 
                                                          
72Article 1 and 25, Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection, June 2014.  
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to engage in such activity as well damaging, altering or deteriorating data in a fraudulent 
manner are framed as conduct that must constitute offences in the legislation of member 
states. There is also a requirement to adopt robust regulation for vendors of information 
communications and technology to ensure that their products have safety guarantee 
assessments. Computerised data breaches are also contained under this same article and are 
described as fraudulent interception of data that is computerised from or within a computer 
system; the use of such data while knowing that it has been obtained through fraudulent 
means; procuring such data for any person for any benefit should all constitute offences in 
terms of the convention. Where content-related offences are concerned, this same article 
provides mainly for child pornography as well as the nature of content that relates to material 
that is racist, xenophobic or involving the hurling of insults by one group of persons to 
another. This includes any crimes against humanity such as genocide which are committed 
through a computer system. The convention then goes further to provide the security 
measures that ought to be taken for offences that relate to electronic messages and in doing 
so, states that regulatory mechanisms ought to be developed to ensure that digital evidence is 
admissible in criminal cases provided that the integrity of such evidence is retained.73 
 
Article 30 specifically provides for those ICT-related offences that are applicable to property 
providing that conduct which entails the violation of property by way of utilising a computer 
system must constitute an unlawful offence in the legislative frameworks of the member states. 
Furthermore that the use of ICT in property-related offences shall be considered as an 
aggravating circumstance for purposes of sentencing after conviction. Under this Article, it is 
also provided that the regulatory mechanism adopted shall be such that it is not only natural 
persons that can be held criminally liable but also legal persons. Put differently, these 
regulatory mechanisms must be framed in such a way that they can be extended to the 
criminal liability of legal persons.74 
 
As a member of the African Union and having ratified this convention, it follows that the 
legislation developed in Kenya, as well as South Africa, contain similar provisions as those 
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that have been required in the convention and that appropriate institutions have been 
established. The discussion into these two jurisdictions illustrates that the legislative 
frameworks that have been developed depict what has been provided for in the convention.  
 
2.3.1 Kenya 
Preceding the enactment of legislation specially designed to address cybercrime and other 
cyber matters the Kenya Information and Communications Act (KICA) was enacted in 1998 and 
was amended by the Kenya Communications Amendment Act 2008. The objective of this Act was 
the regulation of electronic transactions (e-commerce) and to outline what constitutes offences 
such as electronic fraud among other offences committed on the internet.75 Similar to the 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (which is discussed in paragraph 2.3.2 below) 
this Act contains a number of provisions which specifically address issues relating to 
cybercriminal activity:76  
 Section 83U provides for unauthorised access to computer data and states that any 
person who is responsible for causing a computer system to perform a function with 
the knowledge that he/she is unauthorised to perform such a function, has committed 
an offence and is, therefore, liable for a fine and/or imprisonment. The section 
excludes classes of persons including those which are authorised, who act out of a 
reasonable belief that consent is given and those who rely on statutory provisions in 
their conduct.  
 Section 83V creates an offence out of the access described in section 83U when such 
access is with the intent of committing a crime in which case it is immaterial whether 
said person is authorised to access the computer system. 
 Section 83W creates offence out of unauthorised access to and an interception to a 
computer service and outline the liability for such conduct.  
 Section 83X provides for unauthorised modification of computer material and states 
that where any person modifies data with the knowledge that he/she is unauthorised 
                                                          
75 Kenya Information and Communications (Act 2 of 1998). 
76 Section 83U – 84H, Kenya Information and Communications (Act 2 of 1998). 
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to do so, such a person has committted an offence for which he/she is accordingly 
liable for a fine and/or imprisonment.  
 Section 83Y creates an offence out of damaging or denying access to a computer 
system where the conduct of an unauthorised person accesses a computer system and 
causes direct or indirect damage to such a system.  
 Section 83Z creates an offence out of the unauthorised disclosure of passwords for 
unlawful purposes.  
 Section 84A addresses unlawful possession of devices and data.  
 Section 84B creates an offence out of electronic fraud which, according to this section, 
entails any kind of interference with data with the intention to gain any kind of 
advantage over another person.  
 Section 84C creates an offence out of the tampering of computer codes, computer 
programmes, computer services and/or computer networks where there is a 
requirement for such a computer code to be maintained for purposes of the law.  
 Section 84D and 84E speak to publishing of obscene information and publishing for 
fraudulent purposes and creates an offence out of conduct that is of that nature for both 
of these sections respectively.  
 Section 84F deals with unauthorised access into protected systems which provides that 
it constitutes an offence to secure or attempt to gain secure access to systems that are 
protected in contravention of the provisions as outlined.  
 Section 84H and 84G address offences related to the re-programming of mobile 
telephones and the possession and supply of anything designed for the purpose of re-
programming mobile telephones, respectively. Both sections create an offence out of 
this defined conduct.  
 
The Act discussed above-containing sections that allude to what is now known as 
cybercriminal activity is not the only piece of legislation which contains such sections. The 
Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2012 also creates an offence out of a terrorist act which entails the 
use of an electronic system. This is captured in Section 2(a)(vii) which provides that 
interference with a system that is electronic in nature which causes a disruption in 
communication supply, transportation, financial or other services which are essential 
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constitutes a terrorist act. In Section 4, the offence is outlined and the liability for such offence, 
which in this instance, is a period of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years.77 One can then 
imagine how such a provision could act as a safeguard against acts such as cyberterrorism.  
 
This Act was superseded by the Computer and Cybercrimes Bill in 2017. This Act was enacted 
in 2018 as the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act. It is similar to the above-mentioned where 
it defines and creates a criminal offence out of certain conduct; the procedures to enforce its 
provisions may be found in the Kenya Criminal Procedure Code.78 However, this Act differs from 
the above-mentioned Act in that it outlines a framework for the prompt detecting, 
investigating and prosecuting cybercrimes. In addition to this, the Act enhances the penalties 
for crimes committed using a computer system.79 For instance hacking; denial-of-service 
attacks; phishing; infection of IT systems with malware; possession or use of any tools to 
commit cybercrimes; identity theft or fraud and electronic theft impose penalties ranging from 
KES200 000 to KES10 000 000. These fines can be imposed with or without imprisonment 
depending on the circumstances of the case.80  
 
The sections in which offences relating to cybercrime are contained in Part III of the Act and 
are described in brief summations below as follows:81  
 Section 14 makes provision for unauthorised access and states that a person is guilty 
of an offence if such person causes a computer system to perform a function whether 
this is a temporary or permanent state through the infringement of security measures 
and does so in an attempt to gain access while having the knowledge that such access 
is unauthorised. According to this section, access is unauthorised if the person 
accessing the computer system does not have access to the computer system and/or 
has not obtained the required consent from a person who has the entitlement to gain 
access into the computer system. 
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 Section 15 addresses access with intent to commit a further offence since it has been 
established that the conduct in section 14 constitutes an offence, it is then a further 
offence when a person intends to commit a further offence or to facilitate the 
commission of a further offence. In this regard, it is not material whether such an 
offence is committed at the same time or at another time. 
 Section 16 deals with unauthorised interference, submitting that it is an offence when 
a person who has no authorisation intentionally undertakes any act that results in an 
interference that is unauthorised to a computer system, data or any programme. This 
particular section also creates an offence out of unlawful unauthorised interference 
that results in a financial loss that is significant to any person, poses a risk to national 
security, public health and safety or that which causes the death or physical injury of 
any person. 
 Section 17 speaks to unauthorised interception and provides that when a person 
without authorisation intentionally undertakes conduct that constitutes a (direct or 
indirect whether permanent or temporary) interception of the transmission of data over 
a telecommunication system to or from a computer system, such a person has 
committed an offence. 
 Section 18 pertains to illegal devices and access code and creates an offence out any 
form of trading (such as procurement, manufacturing, supply) or dealing with devices, 
data, programmes which are designed for the primary purpose of committing an 
offence provided for under this Part III is guilty of an offence. This is also applicable 
to the possession, control or storage of any such devices. This section is qualified by 
circumstances where there is a valid reason for manufacturing or being in possession 
of, such as testing a computer system.   
 Section 19 provides for unauthorised disclosure of password or access code which 
creates an offence out of conduct by a person that amounts to the unauthorised 
disclosure of passwords or access codes to any data that is held on a computer for 
unlawful gain or purpose or to occasion loss.  
 Section 20 makes provision for enhanced penalties for offences involving a protected 
computer system stating that where Sections 14 to 17 are committed on a protected 
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computer system which are identified as those that are related to the government there 
shall be enhanced penalties. 
 Section 21 speaks to cyber espionage and it is submitted that a person is guilty of an 
offence where such a person intentionally and unlawfully performs or authorises or 
permits another person to commit an offence that entails gaining access as described 
in section 14 or intercepting data as described in section 17.  
 Section 22 relates to false publications and it is provided that when a person 
intentionally publishes data that is false or misleading or that which misinforms with 
the intention that the data of this nature will be acted upon as though it were authentic, 
shall be guilty of an offence.  
 Section 23 addresses publication of false information providing that where a person 
publishes the nature of information described in section 22 above, through forms of 
media (broadcast, over a computer system) and such a publication has the 
consequence of chaos, panic or incites citizen violence, is guilty of an offence. 
 Section 24 creates an offence out child pornography and states that any person who, 
through the use of a computer system produces, publishes, possesses, downloads or 
trades in material that is child pornography has committed an offence. 
 Section 25 addresses forgery using computers stating that where a person deletes, 
alters, inputs or suppresses computer data in a manner that renders such data 
inauthentic with the intention to have such data acted upon as if it is authentic for legal 
purposes, that person has committed a punishable offence.  
 Section 26 addresses computer fraud stating that where a person unlawfully gains, is 
responsible for unlawful loss to another person or derives economic benefit for to 
him/herself or another person through means which entail the use of computer 
systems (be it impairment, modification, transfer of data or data programmes) such a 
person is guilty of an offence.  
 Section 27 makes provision for cyber harassment and it is submitted that where a 
person, individually or with a group of other persons, communicates with another 
person in a manner that affects the person detrimentally, is not decent or is flagrantly 
offensive in nature, causes the person’s apprehension, or causes damage to the person’s 
property, such a person or groups of persons may be held liable.  
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 Section 28 creates an offence out of cybersquatting, which entails the intentional use 
of names, business names, trademarks or other word or phrases that are registered, 
owned or which are utilised by any other person on the internet or existing on another 
computer network without the necessary authority to do so. 
 Section 29 addresses identity theft and impersonation. The section provides that where 
a person utilises electronic signature, password or any other identifying feature that is 
unique to any other person commits an offence and may be held criminally liable. 
 Section 30 makes provision for phishing, submitting that a person who, for an unlawful 
purpose or to gain unauthorised access, sends a message through a computer or creates 
a website through the use of a computer system with the intention of inducing the 
recipient of the message or the user of the website to disclose personal information, is 
guilty of an offence and may be held criminally liable. 
 Section 31 relates to the interception of electronic messages or money transfers and 
provides that anyone who undertakes to destroy or abort any electronic mail or any 
process through which money or information is being conveyed is guilty of an offence. 
 Section 32 addresses wilful misdirection of electronic messages when a person 
undertakes to wilfully misdirect electronic messages engages in unlawful conduct and 
is, therefore, guilty of an offence.  
 Section 33 provides for cyber terrorism stating that where a person accesses a computer 
system or causes a computer system or network to be accessed with the purpose of 
carrying out a terrorist act, such a person is guilty of an offence.  
 Section 34 addresses inducement to deliver electronic message providing that where a 
person undertakes to induce a person in charge of an electronic system to deliver any 
message that is not specifically directed at him/her such a person is guilty of an 
offence. 
 Section 35 makes provision for intentionally withholding a message delivered 
erroneously and states that where a person detains or hides any electronic mail, 
message, electronic payment, or debit and credit card, which is found by such a person 
or erroneously delivered to such a person and ought to be delivered to another person 
commits an offence. 
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 Section 36 addresses the unlawful destruction of electronic messages, and it is 
submitted that any person who undertakes to destroy or abort any electronic mail or 
process through which money or information is being conveyed, commits an offence.  
 Section 37 creates an offence out of the wrongful distribution of obscene or intimate 
images stating that a person who makes a transfer, endeavours to publish or distribute 
or download images of another person that are obscene or intimate, through 
telecommunications networks or any other means that facilitate the transfer of data to 
a computer system, such a person has committed a punishable offence. 
 Section 38 provides for the fraudulent use of electronic data, and it is submitted that a 
person who does not have authority and knowingly causes another to lose property 
through the alteration, erasure, suppression or input of data which is stored on a 
computer, is guilty of an offence. This section provides the same for electronic 
messages that contain material misrepresentations and the manipulation of computers 
and electronic device systems with the intention to short-pay or to overpay. 
 Section 39 makes provision for the issuance e-instructions which are false stating that 
where a person issues false electronic instructions while such a person is authorised to 
make use of computer systems or other electronic devices for financial transactions, 
such a person is guilty of an offence. 
 Section 42 speaks to the aiding or abetting in the commission of an offence and 
provides that where a person wilfully and knowingly aids or abets the commission of 
an offence or engages in any preparatory activity in anticipation of or the furtherance 
of the commission of such an offence, that person is guilty of an offence.  
 
With cybersecurity and cybercriminal activity being multi-jurisdictional concerns, it follows 
that provision in regulation is made for the trans-border landscape. This Act makes provision 
for these cross-country offences under the international cooperation framed in Part V. This 
part broadly provides for mutual legal assistance between the Central Authorities of different 
States as it relates to undertaking investigations, gathering evidence and expedited 
preservation of data. Provision is made in Section 61 for mutual assistance regarding 
accessing stored computer data; trans-border access to stored computer data with consent or 
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where publicly available in Section 62; mutual assistance in the real-time collection of traffic 
data in Section 63; mutual assistance regarding the interception of content data Section 64.  
 
The Data Protection Bill was passed in 2018 too, and one of the objectives of this bill is to give 
effect to Article 31 (c) and (d) of the Constitution which speaks to the right to privacy. This 
bill also seeks to regulate the manner in which personal data is used and to afford protection 
to data subjects.82 The year 2019 saw the promulgation of the Data Protection Act of Kenya. 
Section 3 outlines the objects and aims for the provisions as, to regulate how personal data is  
processed; to ensure that the manner data is processed is consistent with the principles 
contained in section 25 of the Act; to ensures the protection of individuals privacy; to facilitate 
the establishment of institutional and legal mechanisms for the protection of personal data; to 
ensure that data subjects are afforded rights and remedies to protect their data from being 
processed in a manner that is  not consistent with this Act. Where the applicability of the Act 
is concerned, Section 4 of the Act provides that the Act is applicable to the processing of data 
subjects located in Kenya.83 
 
Despite this progress in the regulatory space, the promulgation of the Computer Misuse and 
Cybercrimes Act has been criticised based on vagueness where definitions of prohibited conduct 
are concerned, using the prohibition of hate speech as an example of this. Furthermore, there 
have been questions surrounding what exact powers of surveillance the authorities have and 
whether these powers could be a violation of privacy which contradicts the Constitution.84  
 
Shortly after its assent, the Act has also been challenged in a petition by the Bloggers of Kenya 
Association (BAKE) against the Attorney General and Others.85 The BAKE challenged the statute 
on the basis that it contravenes constitutional provisions namely, freedom of the media; 
freedom of opinion; freedom and security of the person; freedom of expression; right to 
                                                          
82 Data Protection Bill 2018. 
83 Section 3 and 4, Data Protection (Act 24 of 2019).  
84 Muendo M, ‘Kenya’s new cybercrime laws open the door to privacy violations, censorship’ The Conversation, 
2018 https://theconversation.com/kenyas-new-cybercrime-law-opens-the-door-to-privacy-violations-censorship-
97271 on 10 October 2019. 
85 Bloggers Association of Kenya (Bake) v Attorney General & 5 others [2018] eKLR 
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privacy; right to property and the right to a fair hearing. The high court issued a conservatory 
order suspending several sections of the Act including:  
 Section 5 which speaks to the composition of a committee.  
 Section 16 which dealing with unauthorised interference.  
 Section 17 dealing with authorised interception. 
 Sections 22 and 23 which address false publications and the publication of false 
information respectively. 
 Section 24 which speaks to child pornography. 
 Section 27 dealing with cyber harassment.  
 Section 28 addressing cybersquatting. 
 Section 29 that speaks to identity theft and impersonation. 
 Section 31 on the interception of electronic messages or money transfers. 
 Section 32 which criminalises wilful misdirection of electronic messages.  
 Section 33 dealing with cyber terrorism. 
 Section 34 which speaks to inducement to deliver electronic message.  
 Section 35 addressing intentionally withholding message delivered erroneously. 
 Section 36 creating an offence out of unlawful destruction of electronic messages.   
 Section 37 which deals with wrongful distribution of obscene or intimate images. 
 Section 38 criminalising fraudulent use of electronic data. 
 Section 39 which speaks to issuance of false e-instructions. 
 Sections 40 and 41 addressing reporting of cyber threat and employee responsibility to 
relinquish access codes, respectively.  
 Section 42 which outlines aiding or abetting in the commission of an offence.   
 Section 48 addressing search and seizure of stored computer data.  
 Section 49 outlining record of and access to seized data.  
 Section 50 which provides for the production order. 
 Section 51 addressing expedited preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data.  
 Section 52 dealing with real-time collection of traffic data.  
 Section 53 creating an offence out of the interception of content data.  
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The ruling on this matter is yet to be delivered (January 2020). 86  
 
The Law Society of Kenya (LSK) followed suit in petitioning against the constitutionality of the 
provisions in the Act with the point of view that the questionable provisions pose a threat to 
the Bill of Rights where the rights on arrest and prosecution are concerned. One of these rights 
is the right to freedom of expression in respect of which the LSK highlighted that in a 
Constitutional democracy, the public has the freedom to state their opinions without those 
comments or criticisms amounting to hate speech. Furthermore, the LSK contented that the 
Sections 22 and 23 of Act which address fake news are too broad and vague in the definition 
of what constitutes falseness. According to the LSK, this has an impact on the right of the 
public to receive information since the vague definition does not take into consideration that 
some parts of false information may have value.87  
 
Another petitioner, Geoffrey Maina, also challenged the Act following its assent. Mr Maina 
challenged the Act on similar grounds as the LSK and BAKE, with a focus on the 
unconstitutionality of the Act being passed without public participation. The petitioner also 
noted that the sections of the Act that violate the right to privacy could lead to confiscation of 
property, which constitutes an infringement of the right to have one’s property protected. In 
this petition, the harshness of the penalties was also contented, on the basis that the public 
may be deterred from making any kind of statement out of fear that a harsh penalty will be 
imposed.88 
 
The overarching idea in the above cases seems to be that the provisions in the Act infringe the 
rights in the Constitution, which then renders these provisions unenforceable. Whether the 
court will rule that these sections need revision or not remains uncertain. However, I am 
                                                          
86 Nanfuka J, ‘Sections of Kenya’s Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act Temporarily Suspended’ CIPESA 2018 
https://cipesa.org/2018/05/sections-of-kenyas-computer-misuse-and-cybercrimes-act-2018-temporarily-
suspended/ on 10 October 2019. 
87 Ongeri L, ‘LSK challenges the constitutionality of the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act’ 2018 
https://www.ifree.co.ke/2018/06/lsk-challenges-constitutionality-of-the-computer-misuse-and-cybercrimes-act/ 
on 10 October 2019. 
88 Wangui V, ‘Petitioner challenges the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act’ 2018 
https://www.ifree.co.ke/2018/06/lsk-challenges-constitutionality-of-the-computer-misuse-and-cybercrimes-act/ 
on 10 October 2019. 
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inclined to agree that these are valid concerns because difficulties to enforcement, as 
discussed, are likely to arise where there are contradictions in legislation as well as vagueness 
the meaning of provisions in the law to be enforced.  
 
2.3.2 South Africa  
The South African common law (Roman-Dutch Law to be specific) outlines theft, 
housebreaking and malicious injury as crimes. However, their definitions have proved to be 
unsuitable and narrow to apply in the context of cybercrime, which typically involving 
tangibles, while the crimes in terms of the common law point to intangibles. Before the 
promulgation of any legislation that specifically addresses cyber matters, the common law 
and existing statutory laws were applied.89   
 
In the case of S v Howard, this is illustrated where the court undoubtedly reached the decision 
that causing the breakdown of an entire information system constituted malicious injury to 
property. Furthermore, the element of physical property did not have to be present in order 
for the definition of a crime to apply to criminal activity where all other components are 
present.90 While the courts extended the scope of the common law to find application to 
cybercriminal matters, the regime was found wanting, as it has inherent limitations. To 
respond to this lack the South African Law Commission (SALC) undertook an investigation 
in which it sought to establish whether the common law and other statutory provisions were 
suitable and if not whether there was a need to develop a regulatory framework that speaks 
directly to cybercriminal activity. Following its investigative efforts, the SALC reached and 
submitted the conclusion that a regulatory framework was required to address cyber issues 
more directly as opposed to a system where the scope of common law is extended to apply to 
                                                          
89 Cassim F, ‘Addressing the Challenges posed by Cybercrime: a South African Perspective’ 5(3) Journal of 
commercial Law and Technology, 2010, 118. 
90 S v Howard (Case no. 41/ 258 / 02) Johannesburg Regional Magistrates Court, Unreported. 
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cybercrime.91 These limitations identified in the common law in relation to addressing the 
internet crimes then prompted the promulgation of the ECTA as well as the RICA.92 
 
The RICA was enacted with the view of mainly protecting those who have had their 
communications unlawfully intercepted as well as ensuring that SIM cards for cell phones 
and these cell phones are possessed lawfully. Thus, anyone who does not have authorised 
possession thereof can be held liable under this piece of legislation. The protective element of 
the Act is evident from the clear-cut definitions of direct and indirect communications as well 
as those that cannot be intercepted. It would follow that a party who intercepts those 
communications which cannot be intercepted is then in violation of the provisions of this 
Act.93  
 
Despite developments brought about by this Act, a number of gaps were identified, one of 
these being that its application was restricted to the borders of South Africa, which is 
unsuitable for crimes committed on the internet, seeing that they tend to be of a multi-
jurisdictional nature. The other limitation identified was that the Act would rapidly become 
obsolete because of cybercriminals developing innovative ways to engage in illicit activity.94 
 
As the name suggests the ECTA was promulgated to regulate electronic communications, 
including transactions to ensure that these are facilitated in a manner that upholds interest of 
the public. Cybercrime is outlined in chapter 13 of the Act and a focus is placed on accessing, 
intercepting, extorting, forging and fraudulent conduct through the use of an electronic 
platform. This chapter contains Sections 85 to 89, and each section addresses a different aspect 
that alludes to cybercrime:95  
                                                          
91 Van der Merwe D, ‘A Comparative Overview Of The (Sometimes Uneasy) Relationship Between Digital 
Information And Certain Legal Fields In South Africa And Uganda’ 17(01) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 
2014, 310.  
92 Schultz CB, ‘Cybercrime: An Analysis of Current Legislation in South Africa’ published, University of Pretoria, 
Pretoria, 2016, 16. 
93 Chapter 9, Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information 
(Act 70 of 2002). 
94 Watney M, ‘The Evolution of Internet Legal Regulation in Addressing Crime and Terrorism’ 2(2) Journal of Digital 
Forensics, Security and Law 2007, 52.  
95 Chapter 13, Electronic Communications and Transactions (Act 25 of 2002). 
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 Section 85 defines access to include conduct by a person who takes note of data and 
continues to access such data in spite of becoming aware that he/she is unauthorised 
to access such data.  
 Section 86 addresses unauthorised access to, interception of or interference with data. 
Subsection (1) creates an offence out of intentionally accessing or intercepting any data 
without permission or authorisation to do so. Subsection (2) creates an offence out of 
the conduct as described in subsection (1) in a manner that causes such data to be 
modified, destroyed or rendered ineffective in some way. Subsection (3) creates an 
offence out of conduct which seeks to defeat the security measures of a system or to 
otherwise disregard passwords in order to gain entry into a system. Subsection (4) 
creates an offence out of the conduct, outlined in subsection (3) as a means to 
unlawfully defeat security measures, which are specifically designed to protect data. 
Subsection (5) creates an offence out of conduct with the intent to deny service to 
legitimate users.  
 Section 87 addresses fraud, extortion and forgery which are computer-related. 
Subsections (1) and (2) of this section create an offence out of performing or attempting 
to perform any of the aforementioned actions seeking to obtain an unlawful advantage 
with the intention of presenting any data or information in a fraudulent manner.  
 Section 88 provides that any person who attempts to or aids and abets any other person 
attempting to commit any of the afore-mentioned offences is guilty of an offence. 
 Section 89 of this Act then provides the penalties for the conduct provided for above. 
These penalties range from periods not exceeding 12 months, periods not exceeding 
five-year imprisonment as well as the imposition of fines.  
 
One can see from the cybercrimes covered under this Act that there was no adequate coverage 
of the broad range of cybercrimes that can be committed on the internet. This inadequate 
cover also reveals the gap akin to the RICA concerning cybercriminals engaging in illicit 
activity at rapid rates thus causing the legal regulatory frameworks to lag behind the 




The Protection of Personal Information Act that was promulgated in South Africa in 2013 seeks 
to address matters that relate to data protection, such as breaches of security, discrimination, 
and theft. Section 2 of the Act provides the purposes of the Act which may be briefly outlined 
as follows: to protect the right to privacy which is a Constitutional right through safeguarding 
information when a responsible party processes it within the ambit of limitations which is 
justifiable, such as the free flow of information; regulating the manners in which information 
of a personal nature is processed ensuring that there are requirements for information to be 
processed lawfully; provision of rights and remedial measures for persons to protect their 
personal information from processing that is in contravention with the Act; the establishment 
of measures to ensure that the rights provided for in the Act are well observed.96 
 
A comparison has been drawn between this piece of legislation and the General Data Protection 
Regulation, which was put forward by the European Union.97 When analysing these 
provisions, one can note the similarity found in the regulations which are in the provisions 
appearing in both of the frameworks, specifically those addressing the rights of data subjects, 
lawful processing of information procedures as well as the recognition of information flows 
which are of trans-border nature.  
 
The year 2015 saw the publication of the National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCFP) 
by the Minister of Security. The overarching purpose of the framework is to create a cyber 
environment or space that is secure and reliable as well as to facilitate and protect this 
environment to the extent that national security imperatives and the economy are supported. 
The South African Government outlines the following specific aims and objectives for this 
framework: to achieve centralised coordination of activities relating to cybersecurity through 
the facilitation and establishment of policy frameworks, structures as well as strategies to 
support cybersecurity. The Government also seeks to foster coordination and cooperation 
between itself, civil citizens and the private sector so that there is a robust interplay between 
policy, legislation, technology and societal acceptance. Promotion of international 
                                                          
96 Section 2, Protection of Personal Information (Act 4 of 2013).  
97 Protection of Personal Information (Act 4 of 2013)  
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cooperation and a culture of cybersecurity; development of skills and research capacity, also, 
to promote compliance and adherence to the appropriate technical cybersecurity standards.98  
 
The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill creates an offence out of a wider scope of criminal 
offences than those which were discussed above under the ECTA. These offences are 
contained in the second and third chapters of this Bill. These sections may be summarised as 
follows: 99  
 Section 2 makes provision for unlawfully securing access and states that any person 
who gains unlawful and intentional access to a computer program, computer system 
or computer data has committed a punishable offence. It is further provided under this 
section that access, which is secured by a person, who affects the computer data, 
program or system, while the access secured is unauthorised, is guilty of an offence. 
Access is unauthorised where it is not lawfully secured, where there is no lawful 
consent obtained and where the limits of the consent or entitlement given, are 
exceeded. 
 Section 3 addresses unlawful acquired data and provides that where a person 
unlawfully overcomes a protection measure on a computer system and, as a result, is 
able to acquire data from or within or to a computer system, such a person is guilty of 
an offence. This measure is also applicable to data that are possessed under these same 
circumstances. Furthermore, if it is reasonably suspected that the data possessed have 
been acquired through unlawful means and the person in possession fails to account 
for such data, such a person may be guilty of an offence. 
 Section 4 deals with unlawful acts in respect of software or hardware tools and 
provides that any person, who unlawfully possesses or deals (manufacturing, supply) 
of software or hardware tools, and makes use of these tools to commit any of the 
offences in Section 2 above, is guilty of an offence. Software and hardware tools are 
understood to mean electronic and mechanical instruments or devices.  
 Section 5 describes unlawful interference with data or a computer program and states 
that a person is guilty of an offence if such person unlawfully interferes with data or a 
                                                          
98 Government Gazette 609, 2015, 12  
99 Chapter 2 and 3, Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill (2017). 
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computer program. The section then goes further to describe this interference to 
constitute that which permanently or temporarily affects (deleting, damaging, altering, 
obstructing) the computer program or data.  
 Section 6 addresses unlawful interference with a computer data storage medium or 
computer system, and under the section, it is submitted that any person who engages 
in such conduct is guilty of an offence. Such an interference is understood as that which 
causes an interruption or impairment to the computer data storage medium or 
computer system. 
 Section 7 addresses unlawful acquisition, possession, provision, receipt or use of 
password, access codes or similar data or devices and create an offence out of illicitly 
engaging in any of the conduct as described in Sections 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 with the 
passwords, access codes or similar data or devices that have been unlawfully acquired, 
possessed, provided or received. 
 Section 8 makes provision for cyber fraud, and it is stated that where a person 
intentionally and unlawfully makes a misrepresentation using data and a computer 
program or by way of interfering with data or a computer program, such a person is 
guilty of an offence. Such a misrepresentation must have caused or potentially caused 
prejudice.  
 Section 9 addresses cyber forgery and uttering and provides that a person who makes 
false data or a false computer program causing prejudice or potential prejudice to 
another person intentionally, unlawfully, and with the intention to defraud, is guilty 
of an offence. This is also applicable where a person who passes on false data or a false 
computer program with the intention to defraud, this is also applicable. 
 Section 10 addresses cyber extortion, and it is submitted under the section that where 
a person intentionally and unlawfully commits or threatens to commit specific offences 
contained in this chapter (Sections 3, 5, 6, 7) with the aim to obtain any advantage 
over another person or in an attempt to compel another person to perform or abstain 
from performing any act, such a person is guilty of an offence. 
 Section 11 outlines aggravated offence, stating that offences committed through the 
use of a restricted computer, the person committing the offence is guilty of an 
aggravated offence. Restricted computers are described as those which are under the 
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exclusive control of financial institutions, critical infrastructures and organs of state. 
Unlawful conduct that grossly impacts the citizens of the Republic is also considered 
to constitute aggravated offences.  
 Section 12 speaks to attempting, conspiring, aiding, abetting, inducing, inciting, 
instigating, instructing, commanding or procuring to commit an offence, and provides 
that a person is guilty of an offence where such person attempts, conspires with another 
person, incites, instigates, instructs, commands or procures another person to commit 
any offence outlined under this chapter. 
 Section 13 speaks to the theft of incorporeal, and it is provided that the common law 
of theft must be understood to be inclusive of conduct that entails the theft of 
incorporeal. 
 Sections 14 and 15 provide a comprehensive outline of the penalties and the competent 
verdicts that are applicable to the different offences, respectively.  
 Section 16 makes provision for data messages which cause damage to property or 
violence and states that a person is guilty of an offence where such a person makes use 
of a computer to make available, broadcast or distribute a data message to a specific 
person or group of persons or the general public and this is done with the intention of 
damaging property or inciting violence against person. 
 Section 17 addresses data messages which are harmful, and submits that a person who 
unlawfully and intentionally makes use of a computer to make available, broadcasts 
or distribute data messages of a harmful nature is guilty of an offence. 
 Section 18 makes provision for conduct involving distributing data messages of 
intimate images without the required consent, and it is stated that a person is guilty of 
an offence where such person who makes use of a computer system to unlawfully and 
intentionally make available, broadcast or distribute data messages which contain 
intimate messages of an identifiable person who has not given consent to such 
broadcast or distribution. In terms of this section, intimate messages are those in which 
the person depicted, is nude, with genital, anal organs and breasts are exposed.  
 
As it has been alluded to in preceding paragraphs, jurisdiction is of particular importance 
where the cyberspace and cyber matters are concerned. The Bill mentioned above addresses 
40 
 
jurisdiction in Chapter 4, Sections 23 which provides that (Section 23(2)) the courts in the 
Republic of South Africa have jurisdiction over cybercriminal matters concerning citizens and 
ordinary residents who are outside of the Republic at the time which such offences are 
committed even in instances where such conduct does not constitute an offence where it is 
committed. Furthermore, in Section 46, provision is made for the circumstances under which 
foreign requests for assistance and cooperation may be made.100  
 
It appears that this Bill acts as an extension of the ECTA, in that most of its provisions are 
similar to those contained in the ECTA, with more areas covered than in the ECTA. This 
extension can be seen in the provision which relates to jurisdiction in Section 23, which 
indicates that South African courts will have extra-terrestrial jurisdiction in certain 
circumstances.101 This progressive step attempts to address the jurisdictional issues that often 
arise with cybercrime, as I have alluded to in the preceding chapter (1.5). 
 
The regulatory mechanisms discussed above have not been without contestation, which can 
be seen in the case law relating to these statutes. The Amabhungane Centre for Investigative 
Journalism presented a case before the court upon the discovery that one of their journalists 
had been surveilled on an unauthorised basis. The organisation claimed that the sections in 
the RICA which allow for such surveillance, essentially spying, are unconstitutional. The 
judge presiding over this case ruled in favour of this organisation and ordered that such 
surveillance be put to a stop; that new wording be inserted into the Act such that only 
surveillance is authorised where the person is informed after a defined period of time; and 
that these various changes are to be in effect up until such time when Parliament passes an 
amended Act or a new piece of legislation completely.102 From this decision the significance 
of role of the judiciary can be seen where developing regulatory frameworks is concerned.  
 
                                                          
100 Chapter 4 and 6, Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill (2017). 
101 Section 23, Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill (2017). 
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2.4 Structural Developments to Address Cybercrime  
2.4.1 Kenya  
Several institutions which can influence the policy-making have emerged with the rapid 
development in the information and communications and technology space in Kenya, a few 
of these are worth mentioning in this study.  
 
In 2007, the Kenya ICT Board was established following a Presidential Order. The purpose 
of the board is to develop ICT in Kenya, particularly in the business process outsourcing 
(BPO) and the services which are enabled by IT.103  
 
The ICT Authority was established in 2013 to, mainly, enhance the manner in which the 
government supervises electronic communication as well as to enforce ICT standards as set 
by the authority.104 
 
In 1999 the Communications Authority of Kenya was established in terms of the KICA with 
the purpose of making possible the development of the sector which relates to 
communications in Kenya. This communication includes several areas with cybersecurity 
and electronic commerce105 being those which are relevant to the study. 
 
Article 240 of the Constitution establishes a National Security Council which is mandated with 
supervisory control over organs for national security in the Republic of Kenya.106 
 
The Kenya Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT-Kenya), also established in 
terms of the KICA and forms part of the framework for national cybersecurity management. 
It is comprised of law enforcement agencies working together with the Communications 
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Authority to address matters of cybersecurity both on a local level and an international 
level.107 
 
2.4.2 South Africa  
Similar to the Kenyan landscape, various institutions have emerged to promote cybersecurity 
in South Africa. These institutions are outlined below.  
 
The establishment of the Critical Infrastructure Council is proposed in Section 4 of the Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Bill, and it is in Section 7 of this Bill that the function of such a council 
is provided. These functions are broadly of an advisory nature on matters that relate to 
identifying, assessing and managing critical infrastructure among other important functions. 
The section states that the council is to advise the Minister on guidelines as they relate to the 
identification, assessment, management of risks associated with critical infrastructure; the 
development of transparent processes and the development of policies to declare and protect 
critical infrastructure, while bearing in mind the budgetary implications; receive and consider 
applications for declarations of critical infrastructure; submit recommendations to the 
Minister on matters regarding critical infrastructure; review risk assessments and compile 
reports to the Minister as well coordinate Government departments and the private sector, 
among other functions.108 
 
There is also the Cybersecurity Response Committee, which is led by the Director-General of 
the State who is assisted by those heading relevant agencies and departments, was mandated 
with strategising and making decisions as well as prioritising areas that require intervention 
based upon assessments conducted to identify threats.109 
 
The Centre for Cyber Security was established by the University of Johannesburg together 
with the Academy of Computer Science and Software Engineering as an initiative to respond 
to cybercrime in Africa. This centre seeks to deliver services in the Cyber Security space as 
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43 
 
well as in Critical Information Infrastructure Protection to interested actors in Southern 
Africa.110 
 
The South African National CSIRT is the Cyber Security Hub which aims to create an 
environment that is safe for all residents to communicate, to socialize and to transact. One of 




The discussion in this chapter provides an outline into the efforts that have been made on a 
regulatory level as well as the institutional frameworks that have mushroomed as a means to 
address the issue of cybercrime to create a safe cyber environment. This is done by viewing 
the legislative frameworks that have developed in recent years in both jurisdictions and also 
through viewing the institutions that have emerged with respect to cyber matters. The purpose 
behind discussing the two jurisdictions in the same chapter is primarily that both form part of 
the African dispensation and can, therefore, present a perspective on the African landscape 
and also that the similarity seen in the developments made in each jurisdiction over the recent 
years.  
 
From the discussion, it appears that various efforts have been made where developing 
legislative frameworks is concerned. However, the literature suggests that there are fewer 
institutions to address the cybercrime issue. This predicament may be attributed to several 
issues that the African continent is faced with. Such issues tend to be the central focus, which 
then creates an environment where efforts towards the resolution of other issues that are 
viewed as secondary ones, such as cybercrime, are not as rigorous as those efforts seen 
towards the primary issues. This position is unfortunate because the recent reports (as outlined 
in the discussion) show that the issue of cybercrime persists and is still pervasive in Kenya as 
well as well as in South Africa. The persistence of cybercrime impacts the potential 
contribution that can be made by e-commerce to African economies.  
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Chapter Three: Regulatory and Institutional Developments in the United Kingdom 
(International Perspective) 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The preceding chapter provides insight into the current regulatory landscape in Kenya and 
South Africa, which have been identified as African states with developing economies. When 
viewing the landscape of these states respectively, one can note that the development in the 
regulatory space is moving at relatively similar paces, therefore, impacting the use of e-
commerce in similar ways. It is for this reason that it becomes important to provide insight 
into a regulatory framework in a developed nation where one can see the benefits of regulation 
and institutions to e-commerce activity.  
 
In this chapter, I have provided an extensive discussion of the regulatory frameworks and 
institutional developments in the UK that are relevant to cyber matters.   
 
I have then proceeded to analyse the criticisms made against these developments and provide 
the shortcomings of these developments in achieving the objective of cultivating a secure 
cybersecurity space. This is done through a comparative analysis of each jurisdiction that has 
been discussed in preceding chapters, with Kenya and South Africa viewed as providing an 
African perspective, and the UK providing an international perspective. 
 
3.2 Contextual Issues Relating to the United Kingdom  
In 2017, the British government valued e-commerce sales in the UK at 586 million British 
Pounds.112The e-commerce industry continues to boom in the UK, at a much faster pace than 
in developed countries, as one would imagine. It is largely dominated by American 
companies, but even so, local companies have penetrated the e-commerce space, which is 
considered to be a sophisticated market. The market comprises traditional retailers as well as 
those that operate purely on the internet: Debenhams is among these as are Currys PC World; 
                                                          
112 < https://www.statista.com/topics/2333/e-commerce-in-the-united-kingdom/>  03 February 2018.  
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John Lewis and Partners; Marks & Spencer; Tesco; Asda; Argos; Asos; eBay UK; Amazon 
UK, all cited as the leading stores in the e-commerce industry.113 
 
The traditional brick-and-mortar model for retail was somewhat threatened by the 
consequences of Brexit and its implications for the stores in Europe. The uncertainty 
surrounding this issue brought more activity to the e-commerce market, as predictions 
indicated that consumers are likely to spend more online. This activity puts both traditional 
and e-commerce retailers in a favourable position, and also highlights the benefit of e-
commerce platforms acting as alternatives to traditional ways of shopping.114 
 
While the use of e-commerce promises economic growth, various factors may inhibit this 
potential growth. These factors have been alluded to above in the context of developing 
countries and can also be seen in more developed contexts. Trust is one of these factors, and 
it is vital to business-to-consumer e-commerce because consumers enter into transactions for 
goods or services with internet traders based on trust that there will be delivery. Once trust is 
established consumers may be encouraged to form long-lasting relationships with retailers 
which is beneficial to the e-commerce market. Awareness, perceived utility and accessibility 
are also a relevant factor in that when consumers have knowledge about e-commerce options 
and view these as useful and accessible facilities, they are more likely to engage. Governments 
have an important role to play in this industry as they are responsible for institutions and ICT 
infrastructure to support the growth of e-commerce for the benefit of a given economy by 
safeguarding the security of consumers because cybercrimes, such as fraud and hacking, are 
a significant impediment to the development of e-commerce across the board.115 
 
The UK fell victim to what was categorised as one of the world’s worst cybercrime incidents 
in 2017, when it was hit by the WannaCry ransomware virus, known as the most widespread 
attack orchestrated by hackers who navigated their way into the National Health Service 
computer system resulting in hospitals and medical staff having to operate their day-to-day 
                                                          
113 < https://disfold.com/top-e-commerce-sites-uk/> on 03 February 2020.  
114 < https://www.e-xanthos.co.uk/blog/ecommerce-uk-online-retail-trends> on 04 February 2020.  
115 Kabango CM, Asa R, ‘Factors influencing e-commerce development: Implications for the developing countries’ 
1(1) International Journal of Innovation and Economic Development, 2015, 65 -66.  
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functions completely offline, essentially caused a shutdown. This National Health Service 
computer system was down for several days until the kill switch was located by a security 
researcher.116 
 
The UK Office for National Statistics issues a Crime Survey on an annual basis. In the latest 
survey released for the year ending in March of 2018 following the case, it was submitted that 
an approximate 4 million cybercrimes were committed in England and Wales combined, over 
a period of 12 months. Within this approximation, an estimate of 3 million of the crimes were 
offences related to fraud and the remaining approximation of 1 million relating to computer 
misuse, which specifically comprised child pornography and hacking. There is also evidence 
that different categories of cybercrimes are more common than others with each year. Not all 
this is bad news, however, because the report also provided that these statistics indicate a 31% 
reduction in cybercrime which can be attributed to more advanced antivirus technology. 
Despite this progress, the UK is warned against complacency because cybercriminals develop 
more sophisticated means to achieve their illicit ends, thus putting users in a constant state of 
vulnerability.117 
 
3.3 Regulatory Mechanisms in Response to Cybercrime  
The Council of European Union (EU) Convention on Cybercrime was adopted in 2001 which 
in section 1, Chapter II contains the offences which are considered to be against the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer and data systems as follows:118 
 Article 2 addresses illegal access and provides that the parties shall adopt measures 
under their domestic law, such as criminal liability, for the intentional access to a 
computer system with the right to access such a computer system. Such an offence 
may be committed through the breach of a security system or other unscrupulous 
intent, which involves the use of a computer system. 
                                                          
116 < https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/4120942/five-of-the-worst-cases-of-cyber-crime-the-world-has-ever-seen-
from-data-theft-of-one-billion-yahoo-users-to-crippling-the-nhs/> on 03 February 2020. 
117 < https://www.tigermobiles.com/blog/cybercrime-statistics/> 04 February 2020. 
118 Article 2 to 11, Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, November 2001. 
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 Article 3 makes provision for illegal interception and provides that each party shall 
adopt measures under their domestic law that are necessary to establish criminal 
offences for conduct that involves the unlawful interception of computer data made by 
technical means, which include electromagnetic emissions from a computer system 
carrying such data.  
 Article 4 provides for data interference and states that each party shall adopt measures 
under their domestic law that are necessary to establish criminal liability for interfering 
with intentionally and without right with data in a manner that causes such data to be 
damaged, deleted, deteriorated, altered or suppressed. 
 Article 5 addresses system interference and provides that each party shall adopt 
measures under their domestic law that are necessary to create criminal offences 
relating to, intentional conduct that results in the serious hindering of the functioning 
capacity of a computer system through the input, transmission, damage, deletion, 
deterioration, alteration or suppression of computer data.  
 Article 6 makes provision for the misuse of devices and provides that each party shall 
adopt measures necessary to establish criminal offences under their domestic law for 
conduct that relates to producing, procuring for use, selling, importing, distributing or 
otherwise making available devices, computer programmes, access codes, computer 
password with the intention to commit offences and without right to do so. 
 Article 7 addresses computer-related forgery. It provides that each party shall adopt 
measures, under their domestic law, to establish criminal liability for the intentional 
conduct of inputting, altering or deleting computer data which results in inauthentic 
data that with the intention that such data be acted upon for legal purposes as if it were 
authentic.  
 Article 8 provides for computer-related fraud and provides that each party shall adopt 
measures under their domestic law to establish criminal liability for conduct that is 
undertaken with the intention and causes the loss of property to another through 
inputting, altering, deleting, suppressing or any interference with computer data with 
the intention to fraudulently obtain economic benefit for oneself or another person.  
 Article 9 addresses offences related to child pornography and states that each shall 
adopt measures under their domestic law to establish criminal offences for conduct 
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that entails producing, making available, transmitting, procuring and possessing 
material that depicts minors and persons appearing to be minors engaged in conduct 
that is sexually explicit.  
 Article 10 provides for offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights 
stating that each party shall adopt measures under their domestic law that creates a 
criminal offence out of the infringement of copyright and such related rights. 
 Article 11 makes provision for attempt and aiding or abetting and states that each party 
shall adopt measures under their domestic law to create criminal offences out of the 
intention attempting and aiding or abetting of any the offences that have been outlined 
from Articles 2 to 10 above. 
 
In 1995 the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union adopted the 
directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data which is no longer in force, with its validity ending in 
2018. It was replaced by the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 
European Union on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data in 2016 otherwise known as the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR).119 Where data protection is concerned, the Data Protection Act 
was also enacted in the UK in 2018.120 
 
Article 1 of the regulation provides that it is a fundamental right of natural persons to be 
protected with respect to the processing of data that is relevant to such persons. The right to 
be extended this type of protection is contained in the Charter of Fundamental rights of the 
European Union. Article 2 provides that where the principles of data protection are concerned 
and the protection of data subjects should not be contingent on the nationality or residence of 
data subjects and should rather be focused on respecting the rights and fundamental freedoms 
of data subjects. Article 3 of the GDPR addresses the territorial scope of the regulation.121 
Despite the consequence of Brexit being that the UK no longer forms part of the EU, the 
                                                          
119 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679> on 03 February 2020. 
120 Data Protection (Act of 2018). 
121 Article 3, General Data Protection Regulation, April 2016.  
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GDPR, as well as other EU regulations, find application to the UK as it will be deemed as 
part of the EU until December 2020 where this period may or may not be extended.122 
 
Richard Lloyd brought a class action on behalf of over 4 million Apple iPhone users, against 
Google LLC before the Court of Appeal. The background to this case is briefly that, from 9 
April 2011 to February 2012 Apple iPhone users were impacted by the Safari Workaround. 
The Safari Workaround enabled Google to set a DoubleClick Ad cookie on devices without 
device users consent or knowledge resulting in Google having access to information 
concerning users’ internet activity, including information on the approximate geographical 
location of users. Prior to proceeding with the claim Lloyd sought permission from the High 
Court to institute the claim for damages outside of the jurisdiction however this was refused 
by the court. Lloyd appealed this decision and was duly granted this permission by the court 
of appeal making reference to both the GDPR and Data protection Act of 2018.123 This 
judgement is particularly significant as it sets a precedent for claims to be instituted outside of 
a jurisdiction when the circumstances allow it. 
 
In addition to the GDPR and the Convention referred to above, as a regulatory mechanism 
applicable to the UK, laws related to cybercrime also exist within the UK. These laws have 
been promulgated over the years. In 1990, the Computer Misuse Act was promulgated, with the 
view of mainly providing for ensuring that computer material is secured against modification 
and access thereto which is unauthorised.  
 
The first section of the Act deals with access to computer material that not authorised and 
provides that a person has committed an offence where he/she prompts a computer to 
perform any function that causes him/her to secure access to computer data or program. The 
section goes further to provide that at the time that such access is secured the person is 
unauthorised to secure the access and has the knowledge that he/she is not authorised. 
Penalties relating to this described conduct also appear under this section. The second section 
                                                          
122 <https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/eu-gdpr-uk-dpa-2018-uk-gdpr> on 03 February 2020. 
123 Lloyd v Google LLC (2019), The Court of Appeal of the United Kingdom. 
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of the Act deals with the unauthorised access into a computer system with the intention to 
commit or facilitate the commission of a further offence. It follows that this is considered a 
‘further offence’ because it has been established the section one constitutes an offence. 
Furthermore, this section provides that this conduct need not be committed at the same time 
or on the same occasion as the conduct outlined in section one. Additionally, that the 
commission need not be possible for a person to have met the requirement to be guilty of an 
offence. In other words, that the intention to engage in illicit conduct is enough to establish 
that an offence has been committed. Section three of the Act creates an offence out of the 
unauthorised modification of computer material. At the time that the offence is committed 
the person must have the requisite knowledge and the requisite intent which, according to the 
section, constitutes an intent to modify data in a manner that impairs the computer or 
computer program. This is also applicable to an intent to prevent or hinder access to data or 
program held on the computer.124 
 
In the fourth section of the mentioned Act, jurisdiction is described, and the territorial scope 
of the Act is outlined. According to this section, this Act applies to the home country of the 
UK being Scotland, England, Northern Ireland and Wales. It then goes further to state that 
for conduct to be considered an offence in the UK, there must be a link with the domestic 
jurisdiction. This link can either be the accused being in the home country at the time the 
offence is committed or the computer that the accused sought to secure unauthorised access 
to being in the home country at the time the offence was committed.125 
 
Electronic communications are dealt with under Electronic Communications Networks and 
Services which appear under Chapter one of the Communications Act of 2003. Section 125 of 
this Act states that a person is guilty of an offence if he/she obtains electronic communications 
services and does so with the intent to avoid payment of a charge related to the use of that 
service. Further that it is an offence where a person possesses or supplies apparatus with the 
intention to aid the contravention of Section 125. In Section 127, an offence is created out of 
                                                          
124 Section 1 to 3, Computer Misuse (Act 1990). 
125 Section 4 and 5 (Act 1990). 
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the improper use of a communications network such as sending messages that are of a gross 
or obscene nature.126 
 
The Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 is concerned with making provision for civil contingencies. 
Cybercrime protection and the achievement of cybersecurity is relevant to Section 19 of this 
Act, which outlines what constitute emergencies and, therefore, requires arrangements for 
contingency. An event which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK, such as a 
disruption to a system for communications, is captured under this section.127 
 
One can see that these pieces of legislation, having been promulgated over a decade ago and 
some more than that, may need to be revised to be adequately applied to the current 
dispensation. The Criminal Law Reform Now Network (CLRNN) submitted a lengthy report 
calling for the revision of the Computer Misuse Act discussed above. The CLRNN cited the 
following reasons for the recommendation that an updated version of the legislation is needed: 
issues with enforcement of the provisions contained in the Act as well legal obstructions that 
could place critical infrastructure in the UK in a vulnerable position; further, the provisions 
of the Act are framed in a manner that exposes cybersecurity professionals to criminal 
prosecution for doing their required work. The CLRNN thus recommends that defences for 
such professionals as well as those for professionals conducting research around cybercrime 
and cybersecurity be built into the updated Act such that there is no exposure to criminal 
prosecution for professionals undertaking this type of work.128 
 
During 2018, it was announced that plans were underway for the building of specialised 
courts for cyber matters, fraud and economic crimes. This step was viewed as promising 
towards the fight against cybercrime, as matters will be brought before presiding officers who 
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are well-informed about cyber matters and a specialised court will allow for the tracking of 
case law to be done with less complexity.129 
 
One of the most significant cybercrime prosecutions was seen by the UK in 2018 when 21-
year-old hacker, Alex Bessell was incarcerated for the commission of over two thousand 
offences. The offence was prosecuted in terms of the Computer Misuse Act. Bessell generated 
copious amounts of money from trading his as well as others’ malware products which 
enabled the creation of viruses, launching of cyber-attacks and theft of data by users. In 
addition to this, Bessell created a shop for online hackers on the dark web.130 
 
3.4 Structural Developments to Address Cybercrime  
With the rise in computer use and the development of cybersecurity measures against 
cybercriminal activity various institutions, strategies and directives emerged in the UK to 
work hand-in-hand with, and to give effect to the legislative frameworks developed. Where 
strategies are concerned a National Security Capability Review was commissioned in support 
of a National Security Strategic Defence and Security Review was implemented in 2015 with 
a national security defence doctrine intended to report on security issues that will demand the 
government’s attention over a decade. Cybersecurity issues will form part of these priority 
issues and are captured as such in the review.131 
 
In 2016, a National Cybersecurity Strategy 2016 - 2021 was implemented in the UK. The 
strategy outlines the UK government’s plan to create secure and resilient cyberspace within 
the UK. Two years following its implementation, a report was issued on its progress which 
contains the strategic outcomes of the strategy itself. These outcomes include: understanding 
the threat; tackling cybercrime through responding and deterring cybercriminals; ensuring 
that the UK has the capacity to respond to and manage cybercrime incidents; to establish an 
active cyber defence to render categories of cybercrimes ineffective; ensuring that technology 
is secure by designing cybersecurity features into products and services; improving the 
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cybersecurity of government to ensure that networks are secure; management of the cyber risk 
in the economy and society; develop the cybersecurity such that cybersecurity can be 
sustained as well as developing the skills pipeline in the sector; research and planning towards 
ensuring the achievement of these objectives.132 
 
The National Risk Register has the purpose of assessing significant emergencies that pose a 
threat or have an impact on all or major parts of the UK and its citizens. These risks are placed 
into different categories, one of which being ‘malicious attacks.’ Malicious attacks in this 
context are understood to include those which are launched using technological means133 thus 
amounting to cybercriminal activity. 
 
In order to remain resilient to cyberattacks and sustain cybersecurity for the financial services 
sector in the UK, the Bank of England Sector Cyber Team in collaboration with the Council 
for Registered Ethical Security Testers (CREST) established the CBEST Vulnerability Testing 
Framework, which is a sophisticated security testing system. This initiative is the first of this 
nature to be spearheaded by any central bank in the world, thus placing the UK in the position 
of a trailblazer in this regard. This system promises to bring benefits to the financial services 
sector, such as access to advanced and detailed cyber threat intelligence as well as analysts 
who are skilled in dealing with cyber threat intelligence. The tests on this system are 
sophisticated in that they are programmed to imitate attacks that target cyber intelligence, and 
in this way can stay up to date with the shrewd techniques used by cybercriminals. Such 
testers are managed by highly skilled professionals which is beneficial in that it limits the pool 
of subjects that can penetrate such systems.134  
 
As it has been alluded to above, there have also been directives by the EU that are still 
applicable to the UK. One is the Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems 
(NIS Directive), which was adopted by the European Parliament 2016 and placed an 
obligation on member states to transplant into their national legislative dispensations. This 
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Directive seeks to improve cybersecurity in the EU context through ensuring that member 
states are adequately prepared and equipped through having a NIS Authority with relevant 
competence as well as a CSIRT. Furthermore, that cooperation between member states and 
different industries in those states is fostered as a means to facilitate information sharing 
between member states particularly relating to threats and risks.135 
 
In addition to this, the revised Payment Services Directive was published by the EU in 2016 
with more comprehensive rules than its predecessor the Payment Services Directive of 2007. 
There are several objectives for this directive, however, making payments more secure and 
safer is most relevant to this study. The revised Payment Services Directive is augmented by 
standards relating to technical regulation; guidelines on the reporting of incidents and 
guidelines relating to the measures to be adopted for operational and security risks as 
developed by the European banking Authority together with European Central Bank. All 
payment service providers are accordingly required to comply with these guidelines.136 
 
With respect to the institutions that have emerged, the National Cyber Security Centre was 
launched in 2016 in the UK. This body provides support to various critical organisations in 
the UK as well as the general public through the provision of appropriate incident responses 
to mitigate the destruction that can be triggered by such incidents. With the use of expertise 
in industry and academia, the body nurtures the capability of the UK to maintain secure 
cyberspace.137 
 
Personal and physical protective advice is provided by the Centre for the Protection of 
National Infrastructure (CPNI), which is the national authority for this service in the UK. 
The CPNI is accountable to the Director-General of MI5 (part of the security service which 
protects the UK against threats to national security) in its functions that entail protecting 
national security through providing assistance in the reduction of national infrastructure 
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vulnerability. The National Security Strategy and National Risk Register, which have been 
discussed above, and the Counter-Terrorism Strategy have a significant impact on the work 
undertaken by the CPNI.138 
 
3.5 Comparative Analysis  
As it was discussed in Chapter one (1.7 research methodology), this study makes use of the 
descriptive research design to describe the state of affairs in the varying jurisdictions. Then a 
comparison is drawn between the findings on the jurisdictions with Kenya and South Africa 
being relevant to the African perspective and the UK presenting the international (developed 
perspective) which is used as a point of reference. Essentially, this constitutes a descriptive 
comparison which has been defined by scholars as a type of study where the occurrences of 
certain phenomena, and the way in which these occurrences differ in varying cases, are 
described.139 
 
In this study, I chose three jurisdictions, namely Kenya, South Africa and the UK. The 
rationale for the choices lies in my intention to obtain and present findings as they apply to 
an African context as well as findings that are relevant to an international perspective. With 
this viewpoint a comparison is drawn between these two perspectives, looking at what can be 
borrowed from one context to the other and enhance the context that is lacking in certain 
respects, in this case, the African context. The focus for these jurisdictions was the interplay 
between e-commerce and its impact on the economies, cybercrime as well as regulatory 
mechanisms. 
 
The points of comparison which I drew from looking at the different jurisdictions are as 
follows: the state of economic development and use of e-commerce in the jurisdiction; 
cybercrime statistics in each jurisdiction; the legislation developed to respond to cybercrime 
in the jurisdiction as well as any case law and prosecutions in terms of these legislative 
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https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/9781118901731.iecrm0035> on 05 February 2020. 
56 
 
frameworks; the institutions that have emerged together with or without legislation to address 
and foster cybersecurity. 
 
In the discussion relating to e-commerce, it was uncovered that e-commerce is undoubtedly 
a booming industry across the world that is mainly comprised of online shopping sites, online 
banking and mobile payments. As such, the industry presents economic growth opportunities 
both in Africa and internationally. In this respect, the research suggests that the African and 
international perspective are similar, albeit the e-commerce industry is much larger in the UK. 
In other words, irrespective of the size of the industry, the potential benefits that could be 
brought by its activity are similar for all of the areas that were researched. 
 
The ability to maximise these benefits is, however, stifled by various factors with cybercrime 
being the most relevant to this study. The statistics relevant to Kenya and South Africa 
illustrate that cybercrime is, and has been, on the rise at alarming rates since as early as 2012. 
Furthermore, that in spite of efforts to directed towards cybersecurity, cybercrime is a 
persistent issue. In the UK, this was a similar position until 2018, when a report indicated a 
decrease in cybercrime with a warning of continued vulnerability despite the decrease which 
was attributed to anti-virus technology.  
 
Several technologies and systems have been developed in the UK to address the cybercrime 
issue. The most significant at present is the CBEST Vulnerability Testing Framework which 
was developed by the Bank of England in partnership with the Bank of England Sector Cyber 
Team in collaboration with the Council for Registered Ethical Security Testers. In addition 
to these institutions, policies and directives have been issued in the UK in response to 
cybercrime as a means to achieve a safer cyber space. When looking at the number of 
institutions in the UK and comparing that number to those in Kenya and South Africa, one 
can see a significant difference in that the UK has established more institutions than those 
which have been established in the two African countries. For instance, in the UK, each police 
department now has a unit that is committed to work, with relation to cybercrime 
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investigations and offender pursuits.140 Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter three (3.3), 
there are plans underway to establish specialised courts for cybercrime and other related 
matters.  
 
The dispensation in Kenya and South Africa where legislation is concerned is more developed 
than the UK. In Kenya, legislative frameworks that speak directly to cybercrime and data 
protection have been promulgated between 2017 and 2019. In South Africa, the situation is 
similar to a bill on cybercrime published in 2017 and the data privacy regulation in 2013. In 
the UK, however, the most recent piece of legislation that is applicable to cyber matters was 
enacted in 2003. For this reason, a report has been submitted calling for revised legislation 
since the act on computer misuse came into force in 1990. In 2018 there was a successful 
prosecution in terms of this Act, as was mentioned in Chapter three (3.2). There have not 
been any prosecutions in Kenya and South Africa in terms of the recent legislation. However, 
certain sections of the Kenyan legislation have been contested in court.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
An analysis of the regulatory environment in the United Kingdom seems to reveal that there 
have not been many efforts put into the framing of robust legislation to address cybercrime, 
and in turn promote a secure cyber environment. Instead, the focus seems to have been on 
the establishment of institutions to respond to the cybersecurity needs in the UK. This 
approach seems to be efficient, which is seen in the statistic reported on a reduction of 
successful cyber offences committed. Those in the legal fraternity in the UK have, however, 
submitted that there is a need for updated laws with the view that these developments will 
contribute to further victories in the fight against cybercrime. 
 
When one views the differing as well as similar characteristics of these jurisdictions, the 
comparison reveals that there is a similarity in the progression of development that the African 
jurisdictions have taken, which is different from the practices in the UK. The most striking 
difference is that the efforts in the UK have been directed mainly towards institutions and less 
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Chapter Four: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This conclusion is meant to provide a detailed integration of the research findings in respect 
of the impact of cybercrime on e-commerce and regulatory frameworks. The findings in this 
research draw significantly on secondary data regarding the literature, theoretical 
underpinnings as well as legislation and structural developments in each jurisdiction.  
 
In the preceding chapter, an outline of the developments that have been made has been 
provided. However, it has been noted that despite the developments, cybercrime continues to 
be on the rise and a secure cybersecurity environment is, in turn, not achieved. In this chapter 
I submit a conclusion and recommendations on the findings to this research.  
 
4.2 Conclusion  
The world is increasingly making use of the internet for a broad range of reasons which bring 
the promise of human advancement. Therefore, it becomes imperative that the spaces such as 
the internet are secure and measures are in place to protect users as well as to maximise the 
benefits that humans can reap from the use of the internet.  
 
In the introductory chapter of this dissertation, I have described the background of e-
commerce and cybercrimes and the typology of each respectively in order to provide context 
for the manner in which the two are related. An overview of the relevant legislation is also 
provided in this chapter, once again to provide context and demonstrate the interplay between 
regulation, e-commerce and cybercrime. 
 
In the second chapter, I provide in-depth insights into the variables described above in the 
African landscape by discussing the Kenyan and the South African dispensations, 
respectively. The chapter begins with a discussion about e-commerce in these contexts 
specifically through highlighting online stores (such as Zando in South Africa) and mobile 
payment facilities (MPESA in Kenya) that have advanced e-commerce in both these 
countries. I then proceed to explore the cybercrimes statistics with the use of reports from 
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each country. This is done to illustrate the idea that cybercrimes and e-commerce both being 
reliant on the internet leads to an interplay between the two which is essentially cybercrimes 
acting as an inhibitor to the economic growth promised by e-commerce. Since both countries 
are aware of these issues, various efforts have been made to combat cybercrime. These are 
regulatory efforts as well as those that relate to institutions for information communications 
technology. From this discussion, it was noted that the development of legislation seems to 
be the point of focus with not as much on the structural developments. When analysing the 
legislative provisions that exist in the two African jurisdictions, one can make note of the 
ways in which they reflect the provisions in the AU convention which suggests that in that 
regard, both countries have executed the mandate relating to legislative development. It was 
also noted that the legislative developments, while a progressive step, have been contested.  
 
Similar to its preceding chapter, chapter three provides an in-depth overview of the variables 
being e-commerce, cybercrime and regulation. However, the context for the discussion in the 
third chapter is the United Kingdom. The practices in the UK, being more developed than 
the two African countries, can be useful to provide insight into what has been effective in 
combating cybercrime. As such, I explored the legislative framework in the UK as well as the 
structural arrangements relating to cybersecurity and cybercrime. This examination brought 
to light the emergence of strategies and institutions addressing cybercrime than there have 
been legislative frameworks that speak directly and comprehensively to cybercrime. As a 
result of this, scholars and members of the legal fraternity have called for revised cybercrime 
laws. However, it is worth noting that even with this lack of adequate legislation, the 
prosecution has been made and a decrease in cybercrime has been reported.  
 
In these chapters, I have explored the topics with a view of responding to the research 
questions framed in the introductory chapter. The primary question broadly asks what the 
impact of cybercrime on e-commerce in Kenya, South Africa and the UK is. This question is 
answered by the full discussions in chapters two and three in which I provide that cybercrime 




The secondary questions require a response to what constitutes cybercrime, what constitutes 
e-commerce and the impact of cybercrime in each jurisdiction. Essentially these questions are 
a breakdown of the broad primary question and seek to respond to specific elements of the 
broader question. As such, the in-depth discussions into e-commerce, cybercrime and 
structural developments in each dispensation, respectively. From this, it can be concluded 
that there indeed is a relationship between cybercrime, e-commerce and regulatory 
frameworks. The nature of this relationship is that cybercrime is an inhibitor to the potential 
economic growth promised by e-commerce as it compromises the security of e-commerce 
users which makes it difficult for these consumers to engage in e-commerce. Further that in 
order to ensure the security of users, there must be robust regulatory measures in place as well 
as institutions to deter cybercriminals as well as to impose punitive sanctions on perpetrators 
of cybercrime. 
 
4.3 Recommendations  
Kenya and South Africa have both made commendable progress with the development of 
cybercrime and data privacy legislation. The statistics have, however, brought to light that an 
approach that places a focus only on legislation is not the most effective strategy. It appears 
that an effective strategy makes use of both legislation and institutional arrangements to 
respond to the issues brought by cybercrime. 
 
In light of this, I submit that these two jurisdictions can borrow the strategies adopted in the 
UK, where the institutional frameworks are concerned. It is important that there are bodies 
to give effect to the legislative provisions, which can be done through creating a police unit 
for cybercrime; educating presiding officers on cyber matters; training more IT professionals 
as well as providing resources for the development of security systems. The establishment of 
units of this nature is also provided for by the African Union in the Convention on Cybersecurity 
and Personal Data Protection as has been highlighted above. It was noted that some of the 
difficulties relevant to the African landscape are the lack of administrative will, 
implementation programmes which are wanting as well as coordination of inter-




Based on the discussion on the different jurisdictions it can be seen that one aspect of 
regulation cannot be done without the other, meaning legislation should develop together 
with the institutions to implement what is captured in and envisioned by the legislation. In 
other words, it is more the enforcement aspect of regulation that needs more attention in order 
to achieve a holistic approach to combating cybercrime and in turn, maximise the benefits of 
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